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By rejecting traditional legal definitions of "obscenity," Professor
Catharine A. MacKinnon has successfully revived debate on questions about
pornography. 1 Her work has called into question the consensus view that
pornography regulation has dire implications for constitutionally guaranteed
freedoms of speech and of the press.2 Although others have made arguments
for prohibiting pornography, 3 this Article focuses primarily on the powerfully
original work of Professor MacKinnon.
This Article does not concentrate on the legislation that MacKinnon was
instrumental in drafting,4 but rather on the ideas that animated it. We argue
here that while her critique of pornography has had the salutary effect of
shifting the inquiry from aesthetic or "moral" considerations to the specific
harms that pornography allegedly creates, her approach is fatally defective both
in theory and in practice. Part I of this Article gives an account of the relevant
legal background (the law of obscenity) and the traditional ways that scholars
have thought about the problems pornography poses. Part II sets forth
MacKinnon's rejection of obscenity doctrine, her redefinition of pornography,
and her proffered reasons for prohibition. Finally, Part M consists of a critique
of MacKinnon's approach. In it, we analyze her conceptions of both causation
and consent; we describe broad sectors of art and literature that are at risk if a
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I See Catharne A. MacKinnon, Not a Moral Issue, 2 YALE L. & PoL'Y REv. 321,
322-24 (1984) (distinguishing "the male morality of liberalism and obscemty law from a
feminist political critique of pornography").
2 See I at 322, 336-40.
3 See, e.g., ANDREA DWORKN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSEssiNG WomEN 9 (1981)
(defining pornography as "the graphic depiction of women as vile whores" and arguing that
women will never be free as long as pornography exists); Cass R. Sunstem, Pornography
and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.I. 589 (1986) (arguing that "pornography is low-
value speech entitled to less protection . . than most forms of speech").
4 See INDIANAPOLIS, IND., CODE § 16-3(q) (1984). This legislation, drafted by
Professors MacKinnon and Dworkin, was declared unconstitutional. American Booksellers
Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aft'd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
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MacKinnonite approach is followed; we analyze her rhetorical and theoretical
orientation; and we conclude that the radical nature of her argument renders her
proposals deeply problematic.
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND: OBSCENITY AND MORALITY
"I know it when I see it."
- Justice Potter Stewart5
A. Historical Development of Obscenity Law
The proscription of sexually explicit material has deep historical roots. In
philosophy, its genesis can be traced to Plato, who banished the artist from his
ideal state.6 At root, the reasons for Plato's proscription were moral: Plato was
greatly offended by depiction of Olympian concupiscence.7 (Aristotle, in
contradistinction, extolled the cathartic effects of art, especially tragedy.)8
Modem Anglo-American law still bears traces of the fears expressed in the
Republic that immoral art could corrupt the citizenry. English censorship of
expression initially appeared to be more concerned with religious and political
themes than with sexual obscenity. 9 The first reported obscenity cases in the
5 lacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
6 PLATO, The Republic, in PLATO: COLLECrED DIALOouts passim (Edith Hamilton &
Huntington Cairns eds. & Paul Shorey trans., 2d prtg. 1963).
7 Id. at 630-44, verses 386-99 (denouncing, inter alia, Homer's depictions of fear,
Priam "rolling m the dung," violent laughter, and Zeus' being "so overcome by the sight of
Hera that he is not even willing to go to their chamber, but wants to lie with her there on
the ground"); cf. OviD, THE ART OF LovE 105, bk. II, verses 579-86 (G.P Goold ed. &
J.H. Mozely trans., 2d ed. 1979) (recounting the amatory episode of Mars and Venus).
8 ARISTOTLE, Poetics, in BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1455, 1457-58, 1460, 1487
(Richard McKeon ed., 1941).
9 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrrurroNAL LAW § 12-16, at 905 (2d ed.
1988). The classic argument against an unfree (m this case, licensed) press is in John
Milton's Areopagitica. His arguments can be categorized as (1) the historical failure of
censorship and (2) the denigrating (and to that extent un-Chnstian) nature of censorship: we
should 'have confidence m truth's ability to prevail. JOHN MILTON, Areopagitica, in
COMPLETE POEMS AND MAJOR PROSE 717 (Merrit Y. Hughes ed., 1957). This idea,
presaged by Esdras, is closely related to the Holmesian notion of a marketplace of ideas.
D.R.M. BENN=T, ANTHONY COMSTOCK 1119 (Leonard W Levy ed., 1971) (1878)
(quoting Esdras: "As for truth, it endureth and is always strong: it liveth and conquereth for
evermore."). Milton seemed to see virtue m a Millian clash with falsehood:
I cannot praise a fugitive and cloistered virtue, unexercised and unbreathed, that never
sallies out and sees her adversary, but slinks out of the race where that immortal
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United States occurred in the early part of the nineteenth century 10 States soon
passed obscenity statutes; in 1842, the federal government enacted a statute
attempting to eliminate commerce m French postcards and obscene pictorial
matter. "1
Shortly after the Civil War, Congress, urged by Protestant leaders and a
New York City dry goods clerk named Anthony Comstock, enacted legislation
prohibiting obscenity. 12 Comstock, an amalgam of the worst qualities of Joseph
McCarthy and P.T. Barnum, had little doubt about or patience for the works he
found obscene (they included Boccaccio's Decameron and the works of Zola,
Daudet, and Bazac): "The effect of this cursed business on our youth and
society, no pen can describe. It breeds lust. Lust defiles the body, debauches
the imagination, corrupts the mind, deadens the will, destroys the memory,
sears the conscience, hardens the heart, and damns the soul." 13 Comstock
received financial support from Morris K. Jesup, who, in the words of H.L.
Mencken, was "very rich, and very eager to bring the whole nation up to grace
by force majeure."14 Together, the two founded the YMCA Committee for the
Suppression of Vice, whose formidable outgrowth was the New York Society
for the Suppression of Vice. 15 As secretary of the New York Society,
Comstock was authorized to make arrests; he is said to have acted as an agent
provocateur to sniff out peccant booksellers. 16 Soon Comstock's crusade
became national. As a post office agent, he launched spectacular raids and
proceeded to organize antivice societies throughout the country. 17 In 1873,
amid intense lobbying by Comstock and his backers, President Grant signed
vaguely worded legislation authorizing criminal penalties against sending
garland is to be run for, not without dust and heat that which purifies us is trial and
trial is by what is contrary.
MILTON, supra 729-30.
10 William B. Lockhart & Robert C. McClure, Literature, the Law of Obscenity, and
the Constitution, 38 MINN. L. REv. 295,324 & n.200 (1954).
11 TRIBE, supra note 9, § 12-16, at 906 (citing 5 Stat. 566 (1842)).
12 COMMIION ON PORNOGRAPHY, ATT'Y GEN., FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY 12 (1986) [hereinafter FiNAL REPORT]; FELICE
F. LEwis, LiTERATURE, OBscENry, & LAw 10-11 (1976); H.L. MENCKEN, A BOOK OF
PREFACES 255-60 (5th ed. 1924). See generally HEYWOOD BROUN & MARGARET LEACH,
ANrHONY COMsTocK 158-59 (1927).
13 LEWis, supra note 12, at 12; cf. In re Worthington Co., 30 N.Y.S. 361 (1894)
(holding rare and costly editions of Arabnan Niglh, Ovid's Art of Love, Fielding's Tom
Jones, and other works not obscene).
14 MENCKEN, supra note 12, at 257
15 LEWIS, supra note 12, at 10.
16 BROUN& LEACH, supra note 12, at 158-59; BENNETT, supra note 9, at 1011.
17 LEWIS, supra note 12, at 10.
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obscene material through the mails. 18 As early as 1878, Comstock's merciless
prosecution and gleeful indifference to those whose lives he ruined earned him
the title of "first-class Torquemada." 19 Toward the end of his life, Comstock
boasted that he had "convicted persons enough to fill a passenger train of sixty-
one coaches, sixty coaches containing sixty passengers each and the sixty-first
almost full. I have destroyed 160 tons of obscene literature." 20
Prior to the latter part of the nineteenth century, when the efforts of
Comstock and his adherents prevailed on courts and legislatures alike,
American courts had not attempted to define obscenity. 21 But across the
Atlantic,; Lord Chief Justice Cockburn, m The Queen v. Hicklin,22 had
developed a "sensitive-person" test of obscenity- "whether the tendency of the
matter charged.., is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to
such immoral influences, and into whose hands a publication of this sort may
fall."23 American courts soon adopted the Hicklin test,24 by which Theodore
Dreiser's An American Tragedy and D.H. Lawrence's Lady Catterley's Lover
were declared obscene in 1930.25 Three years later, however, the Hicklin test
received a devastating blow. A New York federal district court refused to apply
it, stating: "It is only with the normal person that the law is concerned." 26
Applying this standard, Judge Woolsey found that James Joyce's Ulysses was
18 Id.; see An Act for the Suppression of Trade in, and Circulation of, obscene
Literature and Articles of immoral Use, ch. 258, see. 2, § 148, 17 Stat. 598, 599 (1873).
19 BENNEIT, supra note 9, at 1009.
20 NALRJEpORT, supra note 12, at 13.
21 See id. at 12-13; Lockhart & McClure, supra note 10, at 324-25.
22 [1867-68] 3 L.R.-Q.B. 360.
23 Id. at 371.24 See, e.g., Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29, 43 (1896); United States v.
Kennerley, 209 F. 119, 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1913) (Hand, J.) (applying and criticizing the test);
United States v. Clarke, 38 F. 732, 733 (E.D. Mo. 1889); United States v. Bebout, 28 F.
522, 524 (N.D. Ohio 1886); People v. Muller, 96 N.Y. 408, 411 (1884).
25 Commonwealth v. Fnede, 171 N.E. 472 (Mass. 1930); Commonwealth v. Delacey,
171 N.E. 455 (Mass. 1930). See generally LEwis, supra note 12, at 92-93, 102.
26 United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses," 5 F Supp. 182, 185 (S.D.N.Y 1933)
(Woolsey, I.), aff'd, 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934). Judge Woolsey provided an objective test
familiar from tort law:
Whether a particular book would tend to excite such impulses and thoughts must
be tested by the court's opinion as to its effect on a person with average sex instincts-
what the French would call l'homme inoyen sensuel-who plays, m this branch of legal
inquiry, the same role of hypothetical reagent as does the "reasonable man" in the law
of torts and "the man learned in the art" on questions of invention in patent law.
Id. at 184.
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not obscene.27 The death knell thus sounded for the practice of widespread
proscription of material whose only harm lay m its ostensible power to
"deprave and corrupt" the less strong-willed portion of the citizenry
B. Modem Supreme Court Doctrine and the Obscenity Standard
1. The Miller Test
According to Professor Kathleen Sullivan, "To be prurient and offensive, a
work has to turn you on and gross you out at the same time." 28 This
summation of the Court's analysis, if accurate, belies years of mental toil and
effort to articulate an obscenity doctrine.29
The sisyphean struggle of the Court to establish a workable obscenity
standard began in earnest in Roth v. United States.30 There Justice Brennan
found that "obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech
or press." 31 The applicable test is "whether to the average person, applying
contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken
as a whole appeals to prurient interest." 32 The standard evolved in Memoirs v.
Massachusetts,33 in which a plurality of the Court incorporated "utterly
without redeeming social value" into the definition of obscenity,34 thus
permitting some material previously deemed obscene to enter the domain of
protected speech.
In Miller v. California,35 the Court finally mustered a majority definition
of obscenity:
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether "the average
person, applying contemporary community standards" would find that the work,
taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or
describes in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
27 Id.
28 Jeff Rosen, 'Miller' Time, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 1, 1990, at 17 (quoting
Kathleen Sullivan of Harvard Law School).
29 See BoB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 192-204, 244-53,
279-82 (1979) (describing the Court's efforts and the alleged various personal standards of
obscenity). The frustration, difficulty, and unprincipledness m defining hard-core
pornography was captured by Justice Stewart's conclusory remark, "I know it when I see
it." Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (Stewart, J., concurring).
30 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
31I d. at 485.
32 Id. at 489.
33 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
34 Id. at 419.
35 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
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applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political or scientific value.36
The Miller standard is stricter than that set forth m Memoirs, because speech
could have some (nonserious, nonglobal) redeeming value and yet still be
unprotected. This newer standard permits regulation of pornography "merely
because of environmental or aesthetic harms;" however, "considerations of
gender are irrelevant." 37
2. Child Pornography
The Court created a new category of unprotected speech in 1982. In New
York v. Ferber,38 the Court upheld a state crmunal statute aimed at eliminating
child pornography 39 The Court took notice of the national problem of child
pornography and the practicality of drying up the market by tmposing severe
criminal penalties on sellers, advertisers, and other promoters of the product.40
Ferber is important not only because it created a new category of unprotected
speech but also because it "signal[led] a heightened sensitivity on the Court's
part to the harms that pornographic activity can inflict upon paracipants in
obscene productions as well as viewers of the resulting materials." 41
C. Conventional Approaches to Pornography: Obscenity
Until recently, legislatures, courts, and scholars viewed pornography as a
moral problem.42 Arguments about pornography's tendency to incite illegal
36 Id. at 24 (citations omitted).
37 Sunstem, supra note 3, at 595.
38 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
39 Id.; cf. Osborne v. Oio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990) (upholding statute outlawing mere
possession of child pornography).40 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 760.
41 TRIBE, supra note 9, § 12-16, at 915.
42 See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 20-21 (1973); ALEXANDER M.
BICKEL, THEMORALTrY oFCONSENT 73-76 (1975) (discussing pornography in public places
as a type of nuisance); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMTmG OF AMERICA 248-49 (1990);
RONALD DWORKIN, Do We Have a Right to Pornography?, in A MATER OF PRINCIPLE 335
(1985) (positing a "right to moral independence" through discussion of the Williams Report
and critique of a "moral preferences" argument against pornography); RONALD DwORKN,
Liberty and Moralism, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUsLY 240, 256-58 (1977) (defending
pornography from Devlinesque moral arguments); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Pnncples and
Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 29 (1971) ("[Plomography is increasingly
seen as a problem of pollution of the moral and aesthetic atmosphere precisely analogous to
smoke pollution.... [C]onstitutionally, art and pornography are on a par with industry and
1380 [Vol. 54:1375
NEWLEGAL PURITANISM
behavior are not novel, but as Professor Louis Henkm observed over thirty
years ago, "Obscenity is not suppressed primarily for the protection of others.
Much of it is suppressed for the purity of the community and for the salvation
and welfare of the 'consumer.' Obscenity, at bottom, is not crime. Obscenity is
sin."43 Statutes proscribing obscenity typically include within their definition of
it a reference to the scatological; 44 the focus is at least as much on the "emetic"
as the "aphrodisiac." 45 Thus, analysis has traditionally concentrated more on
offensiveness and less on incitement:
The question about obscenity is not whether books get girls pregnant, or sexy
or violent movies turn men to crime. To view it m this way is to try to
shoehorn the obscenity problem into the clear-and-present danger analysis, and
the fit is a bad one. Books, let us assume, do not get girls pregnant; at any rate,
there are plenty of other efficient causes of pregnancy, as of crime.46
smoke pollution."); Louis Henkin, Morals and the Contitution: The Sin of Obscemty, 63
COLUM. L. REV. 391, 411 (1963) ("Laws against obscenity reflect values of morality,
decency, and modesty inherited from an earlier age and from religious ancestors."); c.
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 28.2, at 633 (3d ed. 1986)
[hereinafter POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS] (arguing that "the law seems on firm economic
ground in giving less protection to sexually explicit art and literature than to political and
scientific ideas"); RICHARD A. POSNER, LAw AND LIERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD
RELATION 331 (1988) [hereinafter POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE] (Arguing against "[the
wide-spread suppression of literature, m the name of morality").
43 Henkin, supra note 42, at 395 (emphasis added).
44See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 254.1(1) (1962) ("Material is obscene if,
considered as a whole, its predominant appeal is to a prurient interest, that is, a shameful or
morbid interest, in nudity, sex or excretion . . . ." (emphasis added)). Most states have
adopted definitions of obscenity that essentially track the Model Penal Code's definition.
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-12-150 (1975); Amz. REv STAT. ANN. § 13-3501 (1989);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-68-302 (1987); CAL. PENAL CODE § 311 (West Supp. 1993); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 18-7-101 (1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 7201 (1989), tit. 11, § 1361
(1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2101 (1977); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-1514, 18-4101 (1987); ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 11-20 (1989); IOWA CODE § 728.1 (1979 & Supp. 1993). KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 21-4301 (1988); KY. REV STAT. ANN. § 531.010 (Baldwin 1990); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 31 (Law Co-op. 1992); MICH. COMP. LAws § 752.362 (1991);
MINN. STAT. § 617.241 (1987); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-5-27 (Supp. 1992).
45 Henkin, supra note 42, at 392 (using a phrase owed to "Judge Woolsey's felicity");
See United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses," 5 F. Supp. 182, 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1933),
aff'd, 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934) (Woolsey, J.) ("[The effect of 'Ulysses' on the reader
undoubtedly is somewhat emetic, nowhere does it tend to be an aphrodisiac.").
46 BICKEL, supra note 42, at 73; see also Henkin, supra note 42, at 392. Henkin states
the following:
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Pornography is thus seen as a matter of bad taste, a nuisance;47 eagerness to
prohibit it may be dismissed as social conservatism or, less charitably, "the
mawkish prudery of psalm-singing shopkeepers and unschooled rustics." 48
Only in the very recent past have commentators, courts, and legislators begun
to consider the special harms pornography presents to women. Catharme
MacKinnon has become both the leader for and the symbol of that trend.
II. MACKINNON'S CRITIQuE OF PORNOGRAPHY
"All I maintain is that on this earth there are pestilences and there are victims,
and it's up to us, so far as possible, not to join forces with the pestilences."
- Albert Camus 49
A. Language and Style: Rejection of Neutral Principles
The lyricism and force of Professor MacKinnon's writings are striking.
Her frequent use of metaphor,50 hyperbole,51 neologism, 52 paradox, 53
Concentration on whether obscenity may-or may not-mcite to unlawful
acts aims beside the mark. The question, rather, is whether the state may suppress
expression it deems immoral, may protect adults as well as children from
voluntary exposure to 'that which may "corrupt" them, may preserve the
community from public, rampant "immorality."
Id.
47 BICKEL, supra note 42, at 74 ("Perhaps each of us can, if he wishes, effectively
avert the eye and stop the ear. Still, what is commonly read and see" and heard and done
intrudes upon us all, wanted or not, for it constitutes our environment.").
48 W.V. QUINE, QUnIDrrms 207 (1987).
4 9 ALBERT CAMuS, THE PLAGUE 229 (Start Gilbert trans., 1948).5 0 See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, "More Than Simply a Magazine". Playboy's
Money, in FEmINISM UNMODIFIED 134, 143 (1987) (stating that sex research of Masters and
Johnson "revolves around the search for the perfect fluck, the modem equivalent of the holy
grail").
51 See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Linda's Life and Andrea's Work, in
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 127, 127 (1987) ("When I mentioned to Andrea what I was going to
do in my twenty-five minutes, she said, it will be twenty-five more minutes than has ever
gone into any of that.").
52 See, e.g., id. at 128 (using the captivating term "porographed").
53 See, e.g., u (speaking of Linda Lovelace: "I do think her expenence on the one
hand is individually extreme, specifically horrible, and unusually brutal, and is on the other
hand a very common, everywoman kind of experience.").
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allusion,54 sarcasm, 55 humor,56 and choice of diction57 lends her writing a
prophetic quality. It is sometimes confrontational and has an 6pater les
bourgeois style. In Feminism Unmodified, Professor MacKinnon does not
couch her arguments in the familiar lawyerly language of disinterested
neutrality; rather, the book consists largely of political speeches. 58 This way of
writing and speaking is also linked to MacKinnon's deeper criticism of "the
definition of justice as neutrality between abstract categories." 59
Neutral principles are generally conceived as rules that a court is prepared
to apply unrelentingly and without exception in all relevant cases. 60 The court
must be held to a standard of consistency across all of the cases it encounters
and the concerns of the court, so the argument goes, should be greater than
54 See, e.g., CATHARmE A. MACKNNON, FEMINISM UNMODIMD 222 (1987)
(referring to "the Three Chnsts of Ypsilanti").
55 See, e.g., CATHARME A. MACKINNON, Francis Biddle's Sister: Pornography, Ovil
Rights, and Speech, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 163, 193 (1987) (commenting on the
purposes of the First Amendment: "who listens to a woman with a penis in her mouth?").
56 See, e.g., supra note 54, at 13 ("Lawyers considering whether anything can be done
for a woman... rarely conclude that they should confront or change the law. They look at
cases the way surfers look at waves.").
57 Professor MacKinnon, unlike the patrician Justice Harlan, prefers what Judge
Woolsey termed "old Saxon words" to more accepted euphemisms. United States v. One
Book Called "Ulysses," 5 F. Supp. 182, 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1933) (Woolsey, J.), aff'd, 72 F.2d
705 (2d Cir. 1934). Her condemnations are graphic: "There is a way to fluck right, and if
you can't manage it, Playboy is there to help you." MACKINNON, supra note 50, at 143.
58 See MACKINNON, supra note 54, at 215 (discussing the dialogic character of these
discourses: "Spoken words carry the specific quality of their birth relation forever, even if
they are later written down as one person's delivery. As a form, speaking remains
dialogue."). Two of Professor MacKinnon's discourses later appeared as articles in
journals. See MacKinnon, supra note 1; Catharine A. MacKinnon, Francis Biddle's Sister:
Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv 1 (1985).
59 MACKINNON, supra note 55, at 164.
60 The seminal exposition of neutral principles was that of Herbert Wechsler. Herbert
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Pnncples of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. Rnv 1 (1959)
(finding it difficult to locate a neutral principle justifying the Supreme Court's decision m
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)); see also ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE
SuPRitM COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 96 (1970) ("The process of the coherent,
analytically warranted, principled declaration of general norms alone justifies the Court's
finction...."); BoR, supra note 42, at 143-53 (discussing neutral principles: mn
derivation, definition, and application of principle). For a recent Supreme Court opimon
relying on "a valid and neutral law of general applicability," see Employment Division v.
Smith, 485 U.S. 660 (1988) (rejecting free exercise claim and upholding state denial of
unemployment benefits to persons dismissed from their jobs because of religiously inspired
peyote use).
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merely those of the moment.61 Judge Cardozo had something like this m mind
when he remarked: "Our jurisprudence has held fast to Kant's categorical
imperative, 'Act on a maxim which thou canst will to be law universal.' It has
refused to sacrifice the larger and more inclusive good to the narrower and
smaller. . . We look beyond the particular to the universal. "62 But
abstract standards and principles, 63 teaches MacKinnon, only appear gender-
neutral; in reality, they are designed to perpetuate male domination. 64
MacKinnon's rejection of neutral principles is reminiscent of the criticism
implicit in Anatole France's description of the French law that prohibited
sleeping beneath bridges: it applied to rich and poor alike.65 True, the Court
has perceived the apparent but false symmetry in "separate but equal" 66 and
prohibition of interracial marriage,67 but it has failed to do the same m its legal
analysis of pornography. Those who have power (white males) construct social
reality (pornography and the pornographic view of women) so that "[i]f the law
61 See Wechsler, supra note 60, at 19.
62 BEmAMI N. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JuDIcIAL PRocEss 139-40 (1921).
63 See generally POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 42, at 108 (presenting
table of opposed conceptions of law).
64 CATHARME A. MACKINNON, Difference and Donurnance: On Sex Discnnunaton, in
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 32, 36 (1987); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, On Exceptionality:
Women as Women in Law, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 70, 71-72. An example of the Court's
neutral treatment of the sexes that has caused much controversy is Geduldig v. Aiello.
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (upholding California disability insurance system,
which excluded coverage of normal pregnancy and childbirth, relying on the somewhat
forced distinction between pregnant and nonpregnant persons). The deeper problem for the
Court is to use a higher level of abstraction to avoid using the male as the paradigm in equal
protection cases. See TRIBE, supra note 9, § 16-29, at 1584 (advocating concept of equality
of opportunity).
65 Michael D. Granston, From Private Places to Private Activities: Toward a New
Fourth Amendment House for the Shelterless, 101 YALE L.J. 1305 (1992) (citing JOHN
COuRNOs, A MoDERN PLUTARCH 27 (1928)).
66 Compare Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding state racial
segregation of railroad passengers under doctrine of separate but equal) with Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (overruling Plessy and the doctrine of separate but
equal). See generally Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lcnfidness of the Segregation Decisions,
69 YALE L.J. 421,424 (1960). Black suggests the following:
[Ilf a whole race of people finds itself confined within a system which is set up and
continued for the very purpose of keeping it in an inferior station, and if the question is
then solemnly propounded whether such a race is being treated "equally," I think we
ought to exercise one of the sovereign prerogatives of philosophers--that of laughter.
Id.
67 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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then looks neutrally on the reality of gender so produced, the harm that has
been done will not be perceptible as harm."68 In short, neutral principles allow
men to rationalize their dominance over women; the harms they commit are
covered up. This refusal to accept conventional legal neutralism is fundamental
to MacKinnon's world view.
B. Rejection of the Obscenity Standard
As observed in Part I, traditional legal analysis of pornography has focused
on obscenity. 69 MacKinnon's work rejects the obscenity approach. 70 Obscenity
is concerned not so much with harm as with offensiveness. 71 Pornography is
broader and more comprehensive than obscenity; the focus is not on the
material's ability to produce sexual arousal in men,72 but on the material's
ability to produce sexual and other injury in women.73 The absence of a
critique of gender in obscenity law, for MacKinnon, "expose[s] both the
enforced silence of women and the limits of liberalism." 74 MacKinnon
proposes that "[o]bscenity law is concerned with morality, specifically morals
from the male point of view, meaning the standpoint of male dominance." 75
But pornography, for the feminist, is not a question of morals (the good and the
evil) but of politics (the powerful and the powerless). 76 In this way, the inquiry
into pornography "is part of a larger project that attempts to account for gender
inequality in the socially constructed relationship between power-the
political-on the one hand and knowledge of truth and reality-the
epistemological-on the other." 77 MacKinnon thus wishes not to ban the
obscene, but rather to ban the pornographic-which makes necessary an
explanation of what she takes the pornographic to be.
68 MACKINNON, supra note 55, at 166.
69 See supra notes 5-48 and accompanying text.
7 0 See MacKinnon, supra note 1, at 322-23.
71 Id. "Obscenity" is etymologically traced to either the Latin for "off-stage" ("scena"
or "stage") or the Latin "caenum" meaning "dirt, filth, mire, excrement;" "pornography"
comes from the Greek "porne" meaning "whore." LuDWIG MARCUSE, OBSCENE: TiH
HISTORY OF AN INDIGNATION 12, 21 (Karen Gershon trans., MacGibbon & Kee 1965)
(1962).
72 MacKinnon, supra note 1, at 329-3 1.73 Id.
74 1d. at 322.
75 Id. at 322-23.76 1d. at323.
77Id. at 325.
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C. MacKinnon 's Definition of Pornography
The feminist theory of pornography derives from the feminist theory of
sexuality: "[P]ornography reflects and reinforces the subordinating structure of
male sexuality and power." 78 As a reflection of male domination, pornography
is not so much atypical as archetypal. 79 The feminist definition of pornography
is linked to a conception of coercion: "Pornography . . is a form of forced
sex ... "80 Like rape and prostitution, "pornography institutionalizes the
sexuality of male supremacy, which fuses the erotization of dominance and
submission ... ."81 Pornography teaches that rape, battery, sexual harassment,
prostitution, and child sexual abuse are erotic. 82 In sum, MacKinnon defines
pornography as based on sexual discrimination:
[P]orography [i]s the graphic sexually explicit subordination of women
through pictures or words that also includes women dehumanized as sexual
objects, things, or commodities; enjoying parn or humiliation or rape; being
tied up, cut up, mutilated, bruised, or physically hurt; m postures of sexual
submission or servility or display; reduced to body parts, penetrated by objects
or animals, or presented in scenarios of degradation, injury, torture; shown as
filthy or inferior; bleeding, bruised or hurt m a context that makes these
conditions sexual. 83
The attempt to eliminate pornography is thus an attempt to minimize the
violence against women which is so pervasr~e m our society. No one could
deny that this definition gets down to cases: what person of good will would
defend, for instance, graphic representations of brutalization of women? In
certain respects, then, it seems a vast improvement over the bloodlessness and
moral neutrality of conventional obscenity doctrine, as so aptly satirized in the
legislative definition of obscenity put forth by Kurt Vonnegut's fictional
Senator Rosewater: "Obscenity... is any picture or phonograph record or any
written matter calling attention to reproductive organs, bodily discharges, or
bodily hair." 84 The problem with Rosewater's definition, of course, is that in
its attempt to minimize vagueness, it seems to maximize overreach. Whether
78 DONALD A. DowNs, THE NEW PoLrrIcs oF PORNOGRAPHY 36 (1989).79 Id. at 40.
80 MacKinnon, supra note 1, at 325.
81 Id. at 326.
82 MACKINNON, supra note 55, at 171.
83 Id. at 176. This definition is substantially the same as that used in INDIANAPOLIS,
IND., CODE § 16-3(q) (1984) (drafted by Professors MacKinnon and Dworkin and declared
unconstitutional in American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985),
af'd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986)).8 4 KURT VONNEGtr, JR., GOD BLESS YOU, MR. ROSEWATER 71 (1965).
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MacKinnon's definition evades either of these notorious problems is addressed
in Part HI of this Article.
D. The Harms of Pornography
Although MacKinnon does not formally separate the types of harm
associated with pornography (indeed, she maintains that pornography is
harmful in itself), we have separated what we understand to be the chief harms
of pornography to simplify analysis.
1. Harms to Those Who Participate
While pornography treats the sexes differently and it is women as a group
who are injured, 85 feminist scholars also believe pornography harms the
individuals who are the actual participants. 86 There is evidence that at least
some actresses and models are "brutally coerced into pornographic
performances." 87 The very titles of some pornographic films and magazines,
Whips & Rope and Ted & Tortured,88 suggest violence and cruelty What
makes pornography particularly insidious is that women are depicted as
desiring and enjoying sexual abuse.89
2. Harms to Victims of Sex Crimes That Would Not Have Been
Committed but for Pornography
Professor MacKinnon states unambiguously that pornography causes
violence against women: "Specific pornography does directly cause some
assaults. Some rapes are performed by men with paperback books in their
pockets." 90 The argument that pornography directly causes violence against
women (and children), probably the most controversial feminist argument
against pornography, is discussed in Part Ill of this Article.
85 MACKINNON, supra note 55, at 178; MacKinnon, supra note 1, at338.
86 See MACKINNON, supra note 55, at 179-80.
87 MacKinnon, supra note 1, at 339 (citing LINDA LOVELAcE, ORDEAL (1980)).
88 The titles of the magazines were gathered from a list published in FINAL REPORT,
supra note 12, at 387-424. The report contains a long list of titles to be recalled not so
much with a blush, but with revulsion and horror.
89 MacKinnon, supra note 1, at 326.90 MACKNNON, supra note 55, at 184 (footnote omitted).
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3. Harms to Society: Objectification of Women
Another harm of pornography lies in its objectification of women. 91
Writing for Nouvelle Revue Fran~aise on the eve of the Second World War,
Simone Well commented: "Force is what makes the person subject to it into a
thing." 92 MacKinnon's view of pornography, linked as it is with a conception
of coercion, shares this notion. She asserts that pornography turns women into
things: corpses or slaves. 93 Here one detects a Kantian or Buberian theme.94
"Pornography .. .creates an accessible sexual object, the possession and
consumption of which is male sexuality, to be consumed and possessed as
which is female sexuality." 95 Contrary to the Kantian view of "a free and
rational agent whose existence is an end in itself, as opposed to
instrumental," 96 women in pornography exist for the purpose of male
pleasure.97
A closely related harm is the educative role of pornography. "Pornography
is ideas; ideas matter. Whatever goes on in the mind of pornography's
consumer matters tremendously "9 The ideas behind pornography and what its
consumers think are important because "[m]en treat women as who they see
women as being. Pornography constructs who that is." 99
91 See ad at 187.
92 BERNARDKNox, Introduction to HOMER, THE ILIAD 29 (Robert Fagles trans., 1990)
(quoting Simone Wel). Knox notes that Weil's essay was scheduled for publication in
Nouvelle Revue Franpase but that Pans was captured by the Nazis before it could be
printed. l.
93 C. MACKINNON, supra note 55, at 181-82 (stating pornography demed women the
ability to be "autonomous, self-defining, and free acting").
94 See MacKinnon, supra note 1, at 341.
95 L. at 328.
96 Id. at 341 (citing IMMANUEL KANT, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE
METAPHYSICS OFMORALS (Thomas K. Abott trans., 1969)).
97 Ld. Professor MacKinnon's argument here is in some ways reminiscent of Martin
Buber's distinction between two attitudes of which humans are capable: I-Thou and I-It. I-
Thou designates a relationship between subject and subject, a relation of reciprocity and
mutuality; I-It designates a relation between a subject and object, involving some form of
use or control, the object being wholly passive. MARTIN BUBER, I AND THOU, pasmfz
(Ronald G. Smith trans., 2d ed. 1958).
98 MACKINNON, supra note 54, at 223.
99 MacKinnon, supra note 1, at 326.
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4. Pornography Silences Women
MacKinnon also argues that the liberal concept of an ideological
marketplace is an inadequate theory m a hierarchical society. 1°° "[The speech
of the powerful impresses its view upon the world" 101 and passes for objective
reality. 102 The terror and fear caused or associated with pornography silences
women's speech. 103 When a woman sees a pornographic depiction, it is a sort
of epiphany: the story is about her. 104 The First Amendment is traditionally
concerned with protecting speech that, but for government intervention, is
free.105 But women's speech is silenced, socially, prior to government
action. 106
This fourfold set of harms led MacKinnon to devise a set of civil laws that
would allow individuals to sue the creators, vendors, and exhibitors of
pornography. 10 7 Materials might then be removed from public availability by
the courts' power of injunction; publishers, booksellers, and video rental stores
would have to be on guard against selling anything that might fall under the
reach of the legislation.
IH. PROBLEMS IN MACKINNON'S APPROACH
The American, save in moments of conscious and swiftly lamented deviltry,
casts up all ponderable values, including even the values of beauty, m terms of
right and wrong. He is beyond all things else, a judge and a policeman; he
believes firmly that there is a mysterious power m law; he supports and
embellishes its operation with a fanatical vigilance.
- H.L. Mencken °8
A. The Problem of Causation
Imponderable counterfactuals. A complete analysis of causation is beyond
the scope of one essay, 1°9 but much of the force of a feminist critique of
1eo See 7d. at 336-37.
101 Id. at 336.
102 Id. at 336-37.
103 Id. at 337; see MACKINNON, supra note 55, at 193.
104 q. MACKINNON, supra note 55, at 188 (describing that a woman believed that she
was tied during sex because her husband used pornography).
105 MacKinnon, supra note 1, at 340.
106 Id.
107 See MACKINNON, supra note 55, at 175-76.
108 MENCKEN, supra note 12, at 198.
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pornography turns on notions of causality: Pornography causes violence against
women. It creates hostile ways of thinking about who women are and what
they want; this hostility eventually erupts into violent acts.110 However, much
of MacKinnon's argument appears unsupported or even insupportable.
Propositions about causality require argument and evidence. I 1
MacKinnon rejects the catharsis hypothesis, that pornography beneficially
releases and redirects the urge to use women sexually; instead, the idea is that
it more often stokes or even creates such desires.'1 2 Recall her statement about
the causal powers of pornography- "Specific pornography does directly cause
some assaults. Some rapes are performed by men with paperback books in
their pockets."11 3 The first sentence is the general hypothesis of unmediated
causation; the second is evidence for it. The image is of pornography
inexorably driving men's actions. Such a method of discerning cause in the
world, however, runs afoul of accepted canons of scientific evidence.
One way of understanding the objection to MacKinnon's inference is to
ask, "How do we know what would have happened absent the existence of the
relevant paperback books?" The short answer is that we do not. However, this
way of phrasing the question is useflul, for it forces us to pay attention to what,
m philosophy, is called the problem of counterfactuals or hypothetical
worlds.114 That is, if some aspect of the world changes, how can we know
what other aspects of the world must necessarily change as well?115 How do
we know that X causes Y?
109 See, e.g., BRTRAND RUSSELL, THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 83-84 (Oxford
University Press 1959) (1912) (explaining that common sense intuitions about causation turn
out to be extraordinarily difficult to justify). The problems of causation have of course
spawned numerous volumes. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART & TONY M. HONORE, CAUSATION IN
THE LAW (2d ed. 1950).
110 See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
I11 Cf. HART & HONORE, supra note 109, at 227-28 (explaining the significance of
evidence to prove causation in negligence cases).
112 See MACKINNON, supra note 55, at 173. A more sophisticated discussion of how
availability of pornography could reduce desires for rape is contained in RIciAD A.
POSNER, SEXAND REASON 366-71 (1992).
113 See supra note 90 and accompanying text. MacKinnon apparently still holds this
view. See Catharine A. Macinnon, Turmnug Rape into Pornography: Postmodern
Genocade, Ms., July-Aug. 1993, at 24 (arguing in part that pornography "primes" men to
enjoy rape).
114 For a technical treatment of several problems arising more or less directly from
counterfactuals, see ANTONY FLEW, A DICrIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY (rev. 2d ed. 1984). For
an interesting discussion of counterfactuals m a legal context, see LEO KATZ, BAD AcTs AND
GuiLTYMINDs 143-45,225-36 (1987).
115 . KATZ, supra note 114, at 226 (showing that disposal of one country's nuclear
weapons does not constitute peace unless other factors are present and understood).
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It is unsatisfactory to identify two factors that go hand in hand with each
other and to conclude from their association that one causes the other. 116 That
is, we have to guard against confusing correlation with causation. If we ignore
this distinction, we might as well conclude that because there is a strong
correlation of shoe size with reading level, possessing large feet causes us to
read better. In fact, the only inference that this correlation would justify is that
both shoe size and reading level are directly correlated with one another
precisely because they are both functions of a third variable, age: high school
students are likely to have much higher reading levels and larger feet than first
graders. A similar example rests upon the positive relationship between the
number of fire trucks at a fire and the amount of damage it creates. Most
people discern that the causal relationship is not that the number of fire trucks
influences the-force of the fire.
People rarely come to such conclusions about reading levels or fire trucks,
precisely because in everyday life common sense about causal forces
intervenes. But the emotional appeal of arguments ascribing causal force to
pornography can cause a temporary shutdown of common sense notions of
causality. Besides, common sense is ultimately insufficient to identify
causation; what is necessary is to demonstrate it in a manner susceptible to
disproof.11 7
A common error when theorizing about causality is to read evidence off of
what has happened in the world while ignoring the necessity-for the purpose
of drawing evidentiarily supported conclusions-of the existence of a control
group. The device of the controlled experiment eliminates this error. Any text
on experimental design will say something like the following: "Basic to
scientific evidence ... is the process of comparison, of recording differences,
or of contrast. Any appearance of absolute knowledge, or intrinsic knowledge
about singular isolated objects, is found to be illusory upon analysis. Securing
scientific evidence involves making at least one comparison." 11s Thus the
evidence of the presence of a paperback book in the rape case is crucially
insufficient, for we cannot know what would have happened in its absence.
116 The classic treatment of this remains DAvID HUME, AN INQUIRY CONCERNING
HUMAN UNDERSTANDING §§ 2, 4-7 (Charles W Hendel ed., 18th prtg. 1977) (1748). A
perhaps more accessible laying out of the issues is Wesley C. Salmon, An Encounter with
David Hwe, REAsoNAND RESPONSiHiLrrY 221 (Joel Femberg ed., 5th ed. 1981).
17TFor an mteredting example of the necessity of theory testing, see Randall*L.
Kennedy's description of two conflicting theories that seem to explain the same social
events. Randall L. Kennedy, Racial C'fiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV L. REV
1745, 1760-87 (1989).
118 DoNALD T. CAMPBELL & JULIAN C. STANLEY, EXPERIMENTAL AND QUASI-
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS FOR RESEARCH 6 (1963).
1391
OHIO STATE LAW JOURIVAL
How might one show causality? Generally, there are two ways. First, one
might actually set up experiments on two groups of people: an experimental
group and a control group. 119 We must then try to decide how an experiment
might demonstrate that pornography creates an increased likelihood of rape.
The need for such a question becomes apparent when we consider how an
experiment would demonstrate that some factor creates an increased likelihood
of rape. We might either argue that pornography creates attitudes that will
increase the likelihood of rape, itself a dubious inference, or we might design
some experiment that would have as its aim actually to cause experimental
subjects to go out and commit rape. To say the least, such a design would have
disturbing ethical implications.
There are even deeper experimental problems with the alternative to a
controlled experiment; that is, the use of the data of the real world as a kind of
quasi-experiment. 120 The first problem is, as noted before, the difficulty in
finding and sorting out otherwise equal experimental and control groups. For
instance, suppose we want to talk to a group of rapists and a group of
nonrapists. Where shall we find the former? If we select them from prison,
there is reason to believe that the institution functions as an intervening
variable. And one suspects that it would be difficult to find self-identified
rapists who have not been convicted.
Scientifically meaningful information about the causal powers of
pornography is therefore rare. In a review of the literature on the causal
powers of nonviolent pornography, Elizabeth and Albert Allgeier write that the
case for its suppression on causal grounds is, at best, inconclusive: "Overall
...there is little support for the belief that exposure to nonviolent erotica
adversely affects attitudes toward rape or evaluations of rape victims. This is
true for both short-term (less than one hour) and long-term (anything beyond
one hour) exposure to nonviolent erotica." 121 The Allgeiers go on to say that it
would be reasonable to suggest that the artificial, sanitized atmosphere of the
laboratory might skew the results of such a survey; they therefore recount an
experiment conducted in a manner that presumably evaded this lnd of bias.
Specifically,
[The experimenters] took advantage of the fact that a sexually explicit movie
was screened twice-once each semester-at a pnvate southern university.
They conducted a field study on the campus to assess the possible links
between nonviolent erotica and aggression.
119 See id. at 13-16.
120 Id. at 6-13.
121 ELIzABErH R. ALLGEIER & ALBERT R. ALLGEIER, SEXUAL INTERACrIONS 564 (3d
ed. 1991).
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On Monday of the week before the film was shown, the authors
questioned more than 200 undergraduate women from the campus on whether
or not they had been the victims of aggression during the previous weekend.
The following Friday night, the film was shown, and the audi6nce included
about a third of the undergraduate men at the college. On the next two
Mondays following the film's screening, the women were again asked to
describe any experiences they had had with aggression over the previous
weekend. There were no significant differences in the percentage of women
reporting aggression before the film's showing (20 percent) versus after its
screening (19 percent and 16 percent). Furthermore, those women whose male
companions attended the movie reported expenencmg no more aggression
from the men than did the women whose compamons had not viewed the
filnL122
The available data on the causal powers of violent pornography provides
little more justification for censorship. Several experiments have measured
arousal caused by rape depictions, but the depictions are eroticized or suggest
mutual consent.123 Given the extremely large market for romances in which (to
say the least) certain sorts of coercion are sentimentalized 124 and given the
predominantly female composition of the buying public for such literature, it is
difficult to argue that women generally perceive these kinds of depictions as
threatening or unpleasant. 125 Regardless, even those experiments that measure
arousal or willingness to deliver electric shocks after the subject has seen
unambiguously violent pornography tell us little or nothing about the subject's
willingness to commit rape. Perhaps the most interesting finding from such
experiments is that the class of subjects who will be most aroused by violent
pornography is predictable ahead of time. 126 When the experimental subjects
are divided into those who admit that, assured of the impossibility of
punishment, they might commit rape and those who nevertheless affirm that
they would not, the former group has a more pronounced reaction to the
depiction of rape. 127 In the authors' words:
12 2 Id. at 564-65.
123 Id. at 566-68.
124 Alice K. Turner, 7he Tenpestuous, Tunuduous, Turbulent, Tomd, and Teribly
Profitable World of Paperback Passon, NEW YORK MAG., Feb. 13, 1978, at 46.
125 See HELEN HAZEN, ENDLESS RAPTURE 29 (1983).
126 See ALLGEIER& ALLGEIER, supra note 121, at 567.
127 See id, at 566-67.
139319931
OHO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Even a rape portrayal emphasizing the victim's pain and distress may, under
certain conditions, stimulate high levels of sexual arousal m viewers. But this
effect appears to vary as a function of whether or not the viewer describes
himself as force-oriented .. Force-onented volunteers reported having more
arousal fantasies after exposure to the rape version than after exposure to the
mutual-consent version. Non-force-onented men, however, reported having
more arousing fantasies in response to the variations of the story involving
mutual consent than m response to the rape variation. 128
This strongly suggests that pornography functions less as a coercive influence
on people's actions (this, after all, is what causation is) and more as a medium
that can only have an effect by modifying the current psychological makeup of
the viewer. That is, pornography does not create, it only channels.
The MacKinnonite may respond, is channeling not enough? That is, is the
possibility that pornography may cause its viewers to have such "attitudinal"
changes that they might otherwise have ignored not enough grounds for its
prohibition?129 The answer to such a query is that the argument proves too
much: If such a loose relationship between mental outlook and subsequent
behavior will justify the proscription of the offending material, then anything
goes. That is, consistency would require that all sorts of speech that have
previously been considered innocuous and irregulable would be in genuine
danger. Indeed, Supreme Court doctrine has recognized this danger; in modem
times, the Court has displayed considerable antipathy towards such loose
accounts of causation whenever possible. Professor Robert Post has ably
explained how current antipornography arguments and their attendant low
standards for causation mirror the positions of the now decisively defeated side
on freedom of speech questions generally:
Tus is precisely the kind of argument that was traditionally offered to
support the regulation of blasphemy. It was contended that blasphemy induced
attitudinal changes toward religion that would lead persons to countenance anti-
social acts. "Public contumely and ridicule of a prevalent religion threaten
the public peace and order by diminishing the power of moral precepts." It is
also the kind of argument used by the Supreme Court in the notorious case of
Debs v. United States. There the Court upheld the conviction of Eugene Debs
for delivering an anti-war speech to the state convention of the socialist party
of Olo, on the grounds that the "natural tendency and reasonably probable
effect" of the speech would be to induce attitudinal changes in the audience that
would increase their willingness to obstruct the recruitment of American forces
for World War I.
128 Id. at 567.
129 Cy. MACKINNON, supra note 55, at 188 (stipulating that women are subjected to
perform sexual acts because of pornography's effects on men).
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As these examples illustrate, the government would acquire enormous and
intolerable powers of censorship if it were to be given the authority to penalize
any speech that would tend to induce in an audience disagreeable attitudinal
changes with respect to future conduct. To avoid the potential for such
censorship the Supreme Court has held that speech can only be penalized
because of a causal nexus to future overt acts if the speech "is directed to
inciting or producing mimment lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such action." Pornography obviously does not meet this test. Given the present
state of the evidence, then, the contention that pornography should be generally
regulated because of its causal connection to future acts of sexual violence is
profoundly at odds with the basic First Amendment principle that seeks to
circumscribe broad government discretion to curtail speech. 130
Ultimately, arguments about the causal role of pornography seem to rely
most heavily on what might be called "folk causation." It would seem most
unwise to accept that pornography has some sort of inexorable causal power
until we have established that there is no correlation between rape and, say,
traumatic childhood experiences of the rapist. The argument loses its force if
causation is metaphorical, not literal. Much more solid evidence is needed
before extrapolation from anecdotal cases of the kind supplied could ever be
justified. Until then, it is likely the best course to stick with the rule currently
accepted by the Supreme Court-that no speech, however advocatory of
violence it is taken to be, can be prohibited unless it incites and is likely to
produce "imminent lawless action." 131  Indeed, the (admittedly scanty)
evidence in a related field suggests that pornography will have little effect on
rape rates. When Final EWt, a self-help suicide manual, hit the New York Tmes
bestseller lists, many mental health experts predicted that suicide rates would
skyrocket. 132 It did not happen: researchers found that the overall suicide rate
in New York City remained unchanged. The only statistic that varied was
relative incidence of suicide methods: the method the book recommended was
the choice of a larger fraction of suicides. 133 Such a finding suggests to us that
books illustrating socially disapproved actions will not create more of those
actions; what they may do, however, is affect the details of actions that actors
are already disposed to perform.
The evidence is ultimately too inconclusive, and the costs of a
MacKinnonite legal regime too high, to walk down the prohibitiomst avenue
she advocates. If evidence of correlation is admissible, it supports conclusions
130 Robert C. Post, Cultural Heterogenity and Law: Pornowgrapy, Blaspheny, and the
irst Amendnent, 76 CAL. L. REy. 297, 325-26 (1988) (footnotes omitted).
131 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,.447 (1969).
132 Sandra G. Boodman, How-to Manual Failed to Increase Smucdes, WAsH. POST,
Dec. 7, 1993, at 25.
133 Id.
1993] 1395
OIO STATELAWJOURNAL
as starkly contrary to MacKinnon's as well as it does her own. As Judge
Posner notes, countries such as Denmark and Japan that have far fewer
restrictions on pornography also have far lower rape rates: it is the countries in
which pornography is harshly repressed (such as the Islamic nations) that the
status of women is correlatively lower.134 Posner concludes that the current
evidence is simply insufficient to support any theory about pornography's
relation to crime rates and the status of women. 135
B. Symbolic Statement
As observed in Part I, it would be a fundamental misunderstanding of
MacKinnon's critique to imagine that causation is the sole consideration in
prohibiting pornography. Indeed, part of the problem with pornography is not
what it causes but rather what it reflects: deeply ingrained misogynist attitudes
and patterns of thinking. We may be troubled by Amos 'n' Andy and Little
Black Sambo not so much because we think they cause racism, but because
they typify an appalling pattern of thinking about African-Americans. 136
Perhaps prohibiting pornography can be seen as a symbolic statement of social
condemnation; a way for people "to symbolically reject, through legal
prohibition, such ways of thinking."1' 37
By symbol, we refer to an outward object or action that makes visible or
partly intelligible powerful inner feelings "which few of us can express in
words." 138 In the medieval era, for example, the circle, which has neither
beginning nor end, symbolized eternity. In the law, especially the criminal
branch, some have seen the appropriateness of symbolism: some have
suggested the symbolic value of capital punishment for murder, or castration
for rape. Sodomy laws are often justified by appeals to symbolism. 139
Symbols, by definition, mean different things to different people.140 As Justice
Jackson remarked, "A person gets from a symbol, the meaning he puts into it,
134 Richard A. Posner, Obsesson, THENEWREPUBLIC, Oct. 18, 1993, at 31, 34.
135 Id.
136 See LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 184-85 (1986). There are,
however, a number of films that are deeply disturbing but nevertheless recognized as
important. Examples include BmmT OF A NATiON (David W. Griffith Corporation 1915) and
TRIUMPH OFTHE WILL (NSDAP and Lem Riefenstahl Studio Films 1934).
137 See BOLLINGER, supra note 136, at 184-85.
138 ALxANDERM. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 94 (2d ed. 1986).
13 9 For an enlightening discussion of tins point, see the exchange between Judge
Learned Hand and Judge Parker. 32 A.L.L PRoc. 128-29 (1955).
140 See BICKEL, supra note 138, at 94. This insight drives the burgeoning discipline of
semiotics.
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and what is one man's comfort and inspiration is another's jest and scorn." 141
Symbolic lawmaking, precisely because of its figurative nature, presents grave
problems. Its practice runs the risk of unbounded application and susceptibility
to the inflamed and transient passion of legislators. It appeals to our poetic
impulses, which may be far out of line with concurrent legal traditions or
conceptions of justice. The danger of symbolic lawmaking is that it can "run
wild, like the vegetation in a tropical forest. The life of humanity can easily be
overwhelmed by its symbolic accessories." 142 Symbolic lawmaking is most
troubling when it encroaches on areas of constitutional interest. Because
legislation concerning pornography falls within an area of intense and
longstanding constitutional concern and is especially likely to be dealt with by
policymakers whose emotions run high, we should demand a good deal more
than symbolism. The necessity for a* higher standard becomes even more
apparent when the contested symbolic status of pornography-is it a symbol of
domination or liberation?-is considered. 143
C. The Problem of Consent and Coercion
Do women have free choice? Much of the power of MacKinnon's critique
of pornography derives from its notion of coercion. In theory, she and any
decent person should find common cause in prohibiting pornography when the
actors are forced or coerced into acting or posing. But her notion of coercion is
a bizarre and counterintuitive one. The Indianapolis ordinance drafted by
Professors MacKinnon and Dworkin casts a strong presumption against consent
of any kind by a participant in pornography. 144 But the impossibility of female
free will, in "contexts of inequality," is less obvious than MacKinnon thinks.
Imagine, for instance, that someone put a gun to your head and forced you
to play a lead role in a pornography film. This is essentially MacKinnon's
rationale for her conclusion that actors in pornographic films are all victims of
pornography; 145 it is a central image in her work. 146 This account of how
141 West Virgnia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632-33 (1943).
142 BicKEL, supra note 138, at 95.
143 For, of course, some men .nd women do find pornography to be an instrument of
liberation. See Sallie Tisdale, Talk Diny to Me, HARPER'S, Feb. 1992, at 37
144 Nan D. Hunter & Sylvia A. Law, BnefAnuc Cunae of Fenumst Ani-Censorsup
Taskforce, et al., in American Bookseller Association v. Hudnut, 21 U. MlcH. LL. REF.
69, 127 (1987) (quoting INDIANAPOLIS, IND., CODE § 16-3(5)(A) VIII-XI (1984)). In this
regard, one is reminded of Mencken's comment on Comstock and his followers: "All the
odds are m their favour from the start. They have the statutes deliberately designed to make
the defence onerous... ." MENCKEN, supra note 12, at 267.
145 MACKINNON, supra note 55, at 179-83.
146 See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 51, at 128-29.
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women are forced to be "pornographed" has two dimensions. First, she relates
how Linda Lovelace was manipulated, tortured, and threatened into performing
in the movie Deep Throat.147 One might question, however, how universal the
coercion of actresses who are pictured performing sex acts is. Is it really the
case that actresses are always coerced when they act m pornographic films? To
this Professor MacKinnon responds, "Not all pornography models are, to our
knowledge, coerced so expressly, but the fact that some are not does not mean
that those who are, aren't," 148 which is to say, it follows from the fact that
some actresses are coerced that some actresses are coerced. The logic is much
the same as that of a 1962 law review article that attempted to support the then-
fashionable theory that cancer could be caused by a sudden, traumatic injury by
wisely noting that "the absence of scientific data to prove that a single trauma
may cause cancer does not mean that cancer cannot result from trauma," 149
nicely skirting the more complex question of what would constitute genuine
evidence one way or another.
Professor MacKinnon has a more substantive argument that no woman
who is acting in a pornographic film is ever exercising free choice:
The further fact that prostitution and modeling are structurally women's best
economic options should give pause to those who would consider women's
presence there a true act of free choice. In the case of other inequalities, it is
sometimes understood that people do degrading work out of a lack of options
caused by, say, poverty. The work is not seen as not degrading "for them"
because they do it. 150
Professor MacKinnon is propounding certain counter-intuitive theses here.
She is describing a world in which women have choices (say) CI to C10 in
order of economic benefits. In MacKinnon's world, choice simply does not
take place for anyone choosing among these options if the chooser suffers from
"inequality." In such a situation, the chooser has to go with C10 precisely
because it is the best economic option; "free choice" does not exist.
Real life, however, is not like this. When choosing among employment
options, people often do consider more than just their ultimate cash intake. In
addition to milieus in which people arguably choose to do tougher or risder
work for higher income, there is also the phenomenon of people who, from all
appearances, seem to make genuinely rational choices despite their economic
147 See MACKINNON, supra note 55, at 180.
148 Id.
149 Rice L. Van Ausdall, Comment, Sufficiency of Proof in Traumatic Cancer: A
Medico-Legal Quandary, 16 ARK. L. REv. 243, 243-44 (1962), quoted in PEM W.
HuBER, ILABIrrY99 (1988).150 MACKqNNON, supra note 55, at 180.
1398 [Vol. 54:1375
NEWLEGAL PURITANISM
circumstances. Consider, for instance, two people from backgrounds of
"inequality," both of whom possess relatively undesirable economic options.
One takes a low-wage job and lives with his or her family; the other enlists in
the Army despite the fact that he or she has other acceptable economic options.
Both of them can be understood as having entirely understandable, albeit very
different, reasons for their choices: the first values personal safety, family life,
and minimal household obligations, while the second is attracted by the
promise of health care, tuition aid, and perhaps a certain social prestige. The
problem with Professor MacKinnon's theory-that free choice cannot exist in
the context of "inequality"-becomes clearer when we consider these two
cases, for her description of free choice simply cannot account for the worker
who chooses to live with his or her family and would have to treat the second
as equivalent to conscription. It does not seem that this would have to be the
case. In fact, the great diversity of choices that people make suggests that these
choices ought to be respected: joining the Army is different from being drafted,
just as voluntarily choosing to take part in a great many enterprises is different
from being coerced into them-even under conditions of "inequality "
It seems ultimately counterintuitive to strip responsibility from real men
and women by inferring from the fact of some choice made that the choice is
conclusive evidence of coercion. 15i A central function of the criminal law is to
punish people who break it, even when the criminal choice that is made seems
most satisfying to the lawbreaker. 152 Deterrence does sometimes fail; when it
does, it is no accepted excuse at trial that the accused should be acquitted
because the lawbreaking option was analogous to C10-that is, because it was
really the best of the lawbreaker's "economic options." We ordinarily treat
even those people in the grip of "inequality" as having rudimentary faculties of
responsibility and choice. 153 In life, it is inevitable that people will make
choices that others view as "degrading."
Of course, some people do not believe that criminals have any choice but
to be criminals. Criminals, on this view, are simply victims of the cruel
combination of a deprived upbringing, economic determinism, and
capitalism. 154 Perhaps MacKinnon holds some view similar to this one; it is not
151 See JANET R. RICHARDS, THESCEPTICAL FEMINIST 13-14 (1980).
152 See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAvE & AusTIN W. ScoTT, JR., CRiMINAL LAW 22 (2d ed.
1986) (stating that "Criminal law is framed in terms of imposing punishment for bad
conduct...").
153 q rd. at 441 (explaining that the "defense of necessity" is traditionally only valid
for pressure arising from "physical forces of nature (storms, privations) rather than from
other human beings").
154 See, e.g., David F. Greenberg, Marxzst Crnunology, in 3 THE LEFr ACADEMY
164, 191-97 (Bertell Olman & Edward Vernoff eds., 1986). This book contains a useful
survey of works m this vein.
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a view new to the University of Michigan Law School. The great trial lawyer,
Clarence Darrow, once a student where Professor MacKinnon now teaches,
was perhaps this century's greatest popularizer of it.155 In the famous Leopold
and Loeb case, Darrow quoted "old Omar Khayyam," and argued we are
But helpless pieces m the game He plays
Upon this checkerboard of nights and days;
Hither and thither moves, and checks, and slays,
And one by one back in the closet lays. 156
Such a view has dire ramifications that may not be nnmediately evident. It
implies, among other things, that our distinction between things capable of guilt
and those that are not is false.157 Applying our working beliefs of blame and
punishment becomes as absurd as Xerxes commanding his soldiers to whip the
offending waves. And the distinction between "being stumbled over and being
kicked" threatens to become without significance, an empty intuition best left to
four-legged creatures. 158 How responsible would Professor MacKinnon say
criminals are-how much of a faculty for free choice would she suggest that
rapists, child molesters, and other sex crimnals have? Are they not truly
blameworthy for their actions? Such a view would sit uneasily with her
repeated condemnations of those who act in sexually coercive ways.
Odd metaphysical notions about freedom of the will have powerful
consequences in discussions of public issues. Take, for instance, a controversy
that briefly flared during the Gulf War, likely now forgotten by all participants:
the allegedly disproportionate number of African Americans who served in
America's armed forces under Operation Desert Storm.1 59 This real-world case
invites us to look more carefully at the questions of choice and coercion that it
155 Cy CLARENCE DARROW, ATTORNEY FOR THE DAMNED: CLARENCE DARRow IN THE
COURT RooM 3-15 (Arthur Weinberg ed., 1989) (illustrating a speech by Clarence Darrow
in which Darrow explains that criminals are m jail because of circumstances beyond their
control).
156 Id. at 65. Defendants Leopold and Loeb, the "boys," were not poor nor were they
unintelligent; nevertheless, Darrow argued that they were victims of their surrounding and
defective moral equipment: "The whole life of childhood is a dream and an illusion, and
whether they take one shape or another shape depends not upon the dreamy boy but on
what surrounds him." Id. at 63.
15 7 This distinction can be traced to Roman law. See DIG. 9.1.1.9 (Ulpian, Ad
Edictum 18).
158 y OLIVER W. HOLMES JR., THE COMMON LAw 3 (1881) (analyzing the
development of the common law from a procedure "grounded in vengeance" to a procedure
grounded m "actual intent and actual personal culpability").
159 See Juan Williams, Race and War in the Persian Gulf, WASH. POST, Jan. 20,
1991, at B2.
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inevitably touches. Is the idea of an all-volunteer force only a label, or is
voluntary military enlistment morally superior to coercion? An article by Doug
Bandow 160 strongly suggests that the military receives applicants from all strata
of society in a manner roughly proportionate to their distribution in society 161
The deviations from this norm lie in the fact that the armed services routinely
draw recruits who are more skilled and better educated than their civilian
counterparts. 162 In 1990, ninety-six percent of recruits managed to score in the
top three categories of the Armed Forces Qualification Test, compared to only
sixty-nine percent of an otherwise equal group of civilians. 163 A sinilar
"degree gap" exists between recruits and comparable civilians: ninety-one
percent of soldiers have high school degrees, while only seventy-five percent of
the civilians in the corresponding sample have them. 164 There is also a
dramatic distinction in favor of the enlistees when it comes to the two groups'
future college plans. 165 Such data suggests anything but a resourceless
proletariat with no options besides military service. Bandow writes that
"conscription would make all African Americans worse off, preventing some
who wanted to serve from joining while forcing some who didn't want to into
boot camp." 166
He and other researchers conclude that the explanation from coercion is
less likely than one based on less malign factors:
Not surprisingly, then, a 1977 Rand Corporation study found that "military
service apparently continues to be viewed as an alternative employment option
for a very broad cross section of American society, from the wealthiest to the
poorest." Similarly, in a recent book devoted solely to this issue, Columbia
University professor Sue Berryman concludes that "the data show
incontestably that enlistees... do not come from the more marginal groups on
any of four dimensions: family socio-economic status, measured verbal and
quantitative abilities, educational achievement, and work orientation. "167
There will of course always be those who allege that those who agree to
join the armed services (or to make pornographic movies) simply did not
understand the nature of what they were getting into. Ray, a character in G. B.
160 Doug Bandow, 7Te Volunteer Anny Represents Amenca, WALL ST. J., Nov. 27,
1990, at A16.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id.
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Trudeau's Doonesbury comic strip, might be taken as a spokesman for tis
view:
B.D.: How long you been in the Gulf, Ray9
RAY: 43 days, man. And I'll tell you one thmg-I sure didn't bargain for this
crap when I upped! I was gonna be all I could be, understand? I was gonna get
a free education, see the world, learn how to program computers! It was
today's army! Nobody said anything about actually having to fight!
Damn, I feel betrayed!
B.D.: Yeah, T.V. ads can trip you up that way.. 168
It is left as an exercise for the reader to determine which is more
appropriate: Bandow's contention that enlistees have authentically chosen their
profession or Ray's anguish that he has been treated unfairly. The data above
suggest the former: the view that poor people lack the freedom and judgment to
make important choices seems mistaken as well as condescending.
The case of the pornography star initially seems even harder, but it is
ultimately an even simpler one. MacKinnon's view that women cannot
authentically choose to be actors in pornographic films is not even true of the
one woman she takes as a paradigm case of a coerced actor: Linda Lovelace. 16 9
Even a quick reading of Lovelace's autobiographical account of her life after
the filming of Deep Throat unambiguously demonstrates that coercion is the
exception, not the rule. Lovelace explicitly distinguishes between her past
experiences of brutalization by Chuck Traynor 170 and her comparatively benign
experiences of poverty while married to Larry Marchiano:
You can imagine how we felt when we went to our Belle Terre post office
and found a letter from a Hollywood producer. The producer would say he
was surprised I had disappeared from public view. And he felt that the public
would welcome a chance to see Linda Lovelace return in a brand new movie.
And the pay would be incredible; offers ranged between $100,000 and a
million.. And all I had to do was what I had done before m Deep Throat.
What I knew, and they didn't, was that there would have been a major
difference this time. This time, no one would have been forcing me. Tis time,
if I acted in a dirty movie, I would be doing it out of need and greed.
168 Cary B. Trudeau, Doonesbury, PINEBLUFF CoM., Sept. 26, 1991, at AS.
169 MAC ON, supra note 55, at 180. MacKinnon refers to her as Linda Marchiano,
but she has published two books as Linda Lovelace, a name by which she is perhaps more
easily recognied.
170 LINDA LOvELAC E, Outr OF BONDAGE 76 (1986). Lovelace's implication that there
were other times that she did not have a choice can only be understood m the context of
Chuck Traynor's frequent threats against her personal safety.
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And this time I had a choice. 17 1
Although MacKiunon uses the life of Linda Lovelace to illuminate
MacKinnon's reiterations that women who act m pornographic films have no
choice but to do so, she does not explain why the experiences of Lovelace, the
woman who is at the center of MacKinnon's accounts of coercion, are flatly
irreconcilable with her theories.
Heeding such an inconsistency is helpful in understanding MacKinnon's
rhetorical strategy, which derives a great deal of emotive mileage out of
implicitly infusing a general term with a contingent and rhetorically convenient
meaning. In philosophy, this technique is known as the "fallacy of persuasive
definition." 172 Such a rhetorical strategy is evident in her refusal to admit, for
example, that women ever have power in this society; she calls female power
"a contradiction in terms, socially speaking." 173 When considering the example
of her own power when lecturing, she labels it "male power." 174 Another
instance of the labels she uses to score gender points is evident m her
description of "male" and "female" forms of athletics, in which the former is
based on competition and victory against another, while the latter rests on a
kind of intrinsic pleasure based on knowledge of the body. 175 When pressed,
she admits that her metaphors of gender do not really describe real males and
their approach to athletics. Her reasons for this use of gender-laden categories
remain unclear unless they are intended to create a kind of schema of moral
171 Id.
172 For the best exposition of this notion, see CHARLES L. STEVENSON, ETHIcs AND
LANGUAGE 206-26 (1944):
Our language abounds with words which, like "culture" have both a vague descriptive
meaning and a rich emotive meaning. The descriptive meaning of them all is subject to
constant redefinition. The words are prizes which each man seeks to bestow on qualities
of his own choice.
Persuasive definitions are often recognizable from the words "real" or "true"
Since people usually accept what they consider true, "true" comes to have the
persuasive force of "to be accepted." Tis force is utilized m the metaphorical
expression "true meaning." The hearer is induced to accept the new meaning which the
speaker introduces.
Id. at 212-14.
173 CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Desire and Power, n FEMINIsM UNMODIFIED 46-53
(1987).174 Id. at52.
175 CATHARUNE A. MACKINNON, Women, Self-possession, and Sports, in FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED 117, 121 (1987).
19931 1403
OHIO STATE LAWJOURNAL
evaluation driven by an abstract set of binary oppositions. 176 This sort of
systematic redefinition, by no means uncommon in her work, is less a method
of resolving disputes with those who might disagree than a kind of conceptual
fait accompli. This strategic ambiguity, when coupled with frequent use of
rhetorical questions and a politics that sometimes approaches the most vulgar
kind of Marxism, may be rhetorically attractive 77 but it is neither compelling
nor coherent. Her use of persuasive definition in the context of her account of
sex does indeed make it difficult to see how any sexuality might be uncoerced:
"[M]aybe they were coerced by something other than battery, something like
economics, maybe even something like love," 178 she writes; but this wrings the
meaning out of what we ordinarily think of as coercion.
This way of understanding the world eliminates the possibility of someone
making a genuine choice to be what is euphemistically called a "sex trade
worker." While such a possibility appears to be prima facie fantastic, a
statement from the Canadian Organization for the Rights of Prostitutes (CORP)
demonstrates that the proposition is by no means impossible:
No one should have to do anything they don't want for a living, but that's
not a reality m life. Most of us end up taking jobs where there are certain
compromises made, so we make a compromise: we'll give up this many hours
of our day (and we've chosen a profession that involves the least hours) for this
much reward, and we've chosen a profession that gives the most rewards in
terms of work hours put in. And we will hopefully have the most control over
our work environment: we will be our own boss. So we know that everyone
has to do something to make a living; we've chosen the things that to us are the
least evil in terms of what we're going to get out of it. We don't think any
woman should have to make the choice to work as a prostitute any more than
any woman should be forced to work m a factory or be forced to be a lawyer
176 The best evidence for this view is presented in MacKinnon's following statement:
By male, then, I refer to apologists for these data; I refer to the approach that is
integral to these acts, to the standard that has normalized these events so that they define
masculinity, to the male sex role, and to the way this approach has submerged its
gender to become "the" standard. This is what I mean when I speal of the male
perspective or male power.
MACKINNON, supra note 173, at 52.177 For an excellent example of MacKinnon's use of all three of these rhetorical
devices, see, ad. at 60-61.
178 CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Sex and Violence: A Perspective, in FEMINISM
UNMODIID 85, 8F (1987).
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or a doctor, for that matter. But we obviously do feel that it's a legitimate
service, and we'd like to be able to provide it to all people. 179
CORP's statement is taken from a remarkable compilation of dialogues between
academic feminists, strippers, and prostitutes. While the weight of the evidence
that the volume provides would by no means give grounds for the conclusion
that sex trade workers have complete and universal job satisfaction,180 it is
replete with testimony that work in this area-for certain people-has its own
rewards. 18' One discussant says "I like it, I can live out my fantasies." 8 2
Another argues that prostitution is good "in and of itself,"183 precisely because
it meets certain irreducible sexual needs. A third, a stripper, reveals that her
choice of a profession-"to be my own boss, to be my independent power
source, to be creative, to express myself fully, without terms of bureaucracy or
established norms-was in fact personally empowering.' 8 4 In view of one of
the newest fads in pornographic films-unpaid and home-made productions mn
which anonymous (but exhibitionistic) couples perform' 85 -one suspects that
some actors in pornography really might consent to being paid for doing work
that others are apparently willing to do for free. 186
The child pornography analogy. The argument for proscribing
pornography based on the child pornography analogy is closely related to
MacKinnon's conception of coercion. Much legal argument depends on
perceiving and making analogies,' 8 7 but wherever disanalogous factors present
themselves, the strength of the analogy is proportionally diminished. Such an
analogy is weak and liable to error and uncertainty. The attempt to analogize
all pornography to child pornography runs directly into this problem.
179 GOOD GIUS/BAD GIRLS 207 (Laurie Bell ed., 1987) (interviewing CORP members
Valerie Scott, Peggy Miller, and Ryan Hotchkiss).18 0 Several discussants at the conference made it plain that they found the work
unpleasant and "degrading." It is imperative that thls Article not minimize their suffering.
See td. at 49-50 (contribution to symposium from "Participant 2"). The point we wish to
underscore is that this subjective impression, like the vast majority of subjective
impressions, is by no means a umversal one.
181 See, e.g., Id. at91, 99, 119, 190.
182 Id. at 48 (contribution to symposium from Peggy Miller).
183 Id. at 208 (interviewing CORP members Valerie Scott, Peggy Miller, and Ryan
Hotchkiss).184 Id. at 190 (interviewing Amber Cooke).
185 Anastasia Toufexis, Sexies and Videotape, TIME, Oct. 29, 1990, at 104.
186 Presumably, the compensation for those who star in the "home-made" films lies in
the knowledge that others might see them.
187 See, e.g., EDwARD H. LEvi, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1949).
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As observed above, New York v. Ferber"8 created a new category of
nonobscene unprotected speech;189 it might be argued that pornography should
be prohibited by analogous reasoning. Child pornography presents the
fundamental problem of consent because the child is incapable of giving it. The
law treats children differently from adults m many ways and for at least three
reasons: (1) because of the peculiar vulnerability of children, (2) because of
their inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner, and (3)
because of the traditional role of parents in childrearing. 190 In infancy, a
considerable amount of absolutism is necessary: a three-year-old child cannot
be left to experiment with a sharp object and learn the consequences. However,
this sort of paternalism, if applied to a competent adult, is insulting. In the case
of women, this sort of paternalism reinforces pernicious and stereotypic
thinking. 191 For a substantial part of this country's history, women could not
hold office, serve on juries, or bring suit m their own names; married women
were traditionally demed the right to convey property or serve as legal
guardians of their own children.' 92 All tus and much more was publicly
justified under a version (there were surely other, darker motivations) of
romantic paternalism. (One is reminded of Tacitus's trenchant remark of the
Romanized Gauls: "What was called civilization was in fact a part of their
slavery.") 193 In effect, paternalism (romantic or otherwise) says to the
individual: we do not trust you to make the right choice (because you are too
irrational or otherwise incapable to know what is best for you), so we will
make the choice for you (because we know what is best for you). But this
approach fails to appreciate the uniqueness of human desires and needs
188 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
189 See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
190 GERALD GUNTHMR, CONSTrUTIONAL LAW 613 n.3 (10th ed. 1980) (discussing
Belloti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979)).
191 Hunter & Law, supra note 144, at 122-32; see, e.g., Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 130 (1868) (upholding law denying women right to practice law). In Bradvell,
Justice Bradley's concurring opinion stated, "Man is, or should be, woman's protector and
defender. The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex
evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life." Id. at 141 (Bradwell, J.,
concurring); see akso Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (upholding state statute
prohibiting women not "the wife or daughter of the male owner" from obtaining bartender's
license); cZ Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (invalidating a statute treating
women m the military differently than men m relation to justifiable rights for dependents
allowances).
192 See Fronfiero, 411 U.S. 677 (discussing sex discrnmination under the guise of
"romantic paternalism").
193 CORNELIUS TAcrrus, DE VrrA AGRiCOLAE [THE LIFE OF AGRICOLA] 107 (R.M.
Ogilvie & Sir Ian Richmond eds., 1967) (in Tacitus's words, "idque humanitas
vocabatur, cum pars servitutis esset.").
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(emotional, intellectual, sexual, and the like) and the fact that knowledge of
such needs is-because we have privileged access to our own minds, but not
those of others-perceived best by the individual in question. In sum, the
approach fails to treat the individual as one whose choices are worthy of
respect.
There is at least one more argument for eschewing prohibition driven by
either the analogy of child pornography or MacKinnon's consent/coercion
theory. To the extent one believes pornography will protect itself by going
underground (there is evidence in the Final Report of the Attorney General's
Commission on Pornography that pornography flourished extralegally before
more liberalizing Supreme Court obscenity decisions), 194 removing a woman's
ability to consent similarly removes her ability to protect herself through legally
enforceable agreements. Makers and participants will be outside the law-and
outside some of the protections it offers.
D. Of Slippery Slopes and Camels' Noses. An, Literature, and the
Costs of Prohibition
The judge as literary critic. In his role as reader for the publisher
Gallimard, Andr6 Gide, one of the century's great writers and literary critics,
initially dismissed Marcel Proust's magnum opus, Remembrance of Things
Past.195 Gide lived to repent in leisure a judgment made in haste. Manet's Le
djeuner sur l'herbe (depicting a luncheon in the country; male figures
surround an unclad woman) was rejected by the Salon and outraged the
Emperor Napoleon III who pronounced it "immodest" 196 (the painting might
disturb a feminist for different reasons). Today it is generally regarded as one
194 FINAL RapORT, supra note 12, at 13.
195 WALLACE FowLE, A READING oF PaousT 28 (1964).
196 JOHN REWALD, THE HISTORY OF iMPRESSIONISM 85 (4th ed. 1973). Agreeing with
the Emperor, a contemporary art critic remarked:
I ought not to omit a remarkable picture of the realist school, a translation of a
thought of Giorgione into modem French. Giorgione had conceived the happy idea of a
fete chaipitre in which, although the gentlemen were dressed, the ladies were not, but
the doubtful morality of the picture is pardoned for the sake of its fine color. Now
some wretched Frenchman has translated this into modem French realism. Yes,
there they are, under the trees, the princpal lady, entirely undressed and two
Frenchmen in wide -awakes sitting on the very green grass with a stupid look of bliss.
There are other pictures of the same class, which lead to the inference that the nude,
when painted by vulgar men, is inevitably indecent.
Id. (quoting Hamerton) (first alteration in original).
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of the masterpieces of pre-Impressiomust French painting. Here we take note of
an important difference between the art critic and the judge: the errors of the
former are only ridiculous, those of the latter are dangerous. The problem we
face with the feminist critique of pornography is to find principled and
reasonably definite lines to distinguish which literature may be permitted and
which may not. In other words, we face the problem all line-drawing presents,
that of overinclusion. The line-drawing experience in obscenity, m the eyes of
many, has proved a striving after winds, a tilting at windmills. Can we, using
MacKinnon's approach to pornography, enjoy greater success?
Consistency-why it matters. With any rule, moral or legal, it is important
that the command speak with clarity and consistency. Before we make the rule,
we want to consider what we are arming at, weigh the consequences, and
determine whether our purpose is sufficient. If we choose to make the law, we
should enforce it uniformly. Ideally, penalties flow inevitably; just as the hot
coal burns the child the first time, so it does the second and the third. The
lesson is learned and learnable. It is important that law speak with equal
consistency, for without it the penalty becomes arbitrary and hence precisely
"cruel and unusual." Any hesitating or irregular infliction of penalties-in
which an offense is greeted this time with lenity and the next with severity-is
prone to abuse by ad hoc administration. So it is vitally important that a rule be
capable of consistent enforcement. We now turn to see if we can make
consistent distinctions between permissible literature and pornography.
Art and sexual mtsogyny. Much art, ancient and modem, is peculiarly
violent, and much of this force is directed at women. Much art, ancient and
modem, depicts women in what might be considered postures of sexual
servility. We can illustrate these propositions with a few examples as well as
some quotes from the classical canon. The Biblical story of Shelah and Ruth,
the poetry of Catullus and Ovid, the Indian Kama Sutra, the frescoes on the
Roman villas of Pompeii, and the poetry of the Earl of Rochester all depict or
describe sexually explicit acts m which women could be seen as assuming
passive or subordinate roles. 197 In the Iliad, where countless souls are sent
197 Women can be found m positions of sexual subservience m the Biblical Song of
Solomon, Ovid's Ars Anatona (Art of Love), Petronius's Satyncon, Catullus's love poetry,
Apuleius's Golden Ass, and Juvenal's Satires (particularly his Sixth). Explicit depictions of
sexual acts m which women arguably assume subservient roles are found m the artistic
traditions of ancient Egypt, Mesopotania, Greece, the Roman Empire, India, China,
Africa, Oceama, and pre-Columbian Central and South America. Cf Thomas McEvilley,
Who Told Thee Thou Was't Naked, ARTFORUM, Feb. 1987, at 102. The publication of
sexually explicit material is a multi-billion dollar industry m the United States. Despite the
attempts to censor or control it, Americans continue to consume sexually explicit material
made available by magazines, videocassettes, films, books, telephone messages, and
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hurling down to the House of Death, the casus belli is a rape. In Paradise Lost,
Milton is quite explicit about the subordinate role of women:
[tihough both
Not equal, as tin" sex not equal seemd;
For contemplation hee and valour formd,
For softness shee and sweet attractive Grace,
Hee for God only, shee for God in hun:
His fair large Front and Eye sublime declar'd
Absolute rule; and Hyacinthin Locks
Round from his parted forelock manly hung
Clustring, but not beneath his shoulders broad:
Shee as a vail down to the slender waste
Her unadorned golden tresses wore
Dishevelld, but m wanton ringlets wav'd
As the Vine curls her tendrils, which unpli'd
Subjection, but requir'd with gentle sway,
And by her yielded, by him best receivd,
Yielded with coy submission, modest pride,
And sweet reluctant amorous delay. 198
Milton eroticizes Eve's submission and Adam's domination; Eve is shown m
postures of sexual servility and submission:
So spake our general Mother, and with eyes
Of conjugal attraction unreprov'd,
And meek surender, half embracing leand
On our first Father, half her swelling Breast
Naked met his under the flowing Gold
Of her loose tresses hid: he in delight
Both of her Beauty and submissive Charms
Smil'd with superior Love .... 199
In Chaucer's Merchants Tale we find sexual objectification of women: a
wife is seen as a tool, good to the extent she serves to secure other values such
as sexual pleasure.2 0 We also happen upon a disturbing sequence of what
computers. Wfilliam A. Linsley, Te Case Agmnst Censorslup of Pornography, in
PORNOGRAPHY343, 343 (Dolf Zillman & Jennings Bryant eds., 1989).
198 JOHN MILTON, PARADISE LOST, bk. IV, 11. 295-311, at 261-62 (Roy Flannagon
ed., 1993); see also id, bk. VIII, U1. 541-53, at 455-56 ("Of Nature her th' infenour, in
the mind // And inward Faculties . All higher knowledge m her presence falls //
Degraded, Wisdom in discourse with her// Loses discount'nanc't and- like folly shewes.").
19 9 Id. at bk. IV, 11. 492-99, at 271-72.
200 GEOFFREY CHAUCER, THE TALES OF CANTERBURY 347 (Robert A. Pratt ed., 1974).
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looks a great deal like spousal rape; the old lecher Januarie "broght abedde as
stille as stoon" his child-bride May. 20 1 In other parts of the Canterbury Tales,
we learn that women's bodies belong to their husbands. 2°2 The Wife of Bath,
who well knows the "wo that is in manage"2 03 relates that she has been beaten
deaf in one ear by her husband ("And with his fest he smoot me on the heed, //
That in the floor I lay as I were deed.") 204 because "I rente out of his book a
leef, [the "book" is a misogynist tract, "the book of wikked wyves"] // For
which he smoot me so that I was deef."205 In the Miller's Tale "hende
[handsome] Nicholas" the clerk, without the consent of the "yonge wyf" (not
his but the Carpenter's) "prively . . caughte hire [her] by the queynte
[crotch]" and "heeld hire harde by the haunchebones." 206
Shakespeare too offers his share of disturbing sexual images. At the
besieged Harfleur, the young King Henry V asks, "What is't to me... If your
pure maidens fall into the hand // Of hot and forcing violation?" 20 7 Here we
are given the image of the bloody soldier's hand "[d]efil[ing] the locks of your
shrill-shrieking daughters." 208
We could go on at some length reciting Catullus's poems of Lesbia, Ovid's
account of Verginia, and many other fusions of eroticism and violence (either
express or implied) in art and literature. 209 Helen Hazen's Endless Rapture
contains a detailed account of depictions of subordinated women m literature;
her summary ranges from Austen, Eliot, and the Brontes to modem romance
novels. 210 Our intent m piling up examples of possible subordination is not to
demonstrate the existence of a gray area; rather, there is some question whether
anything falls outside of it. But the implications of MacKinnon's argument are
that we cannot (indeed, we must not) stop to make distinctions between
valuable and valueless works. What matters is that women are subjugated. 211
Great art and literature depicting women as submissively enjoying sexual
subjugation and abuse are especially insidious because "legitimate settings
diminish the perception of injury done to those whose trivialization and
201 Id. at 356.
202 Id. at 543.
203 Id. at 252.
204 Id. at 272-73.
205 Id. at 268.
206 Id. at 82.
2 07 WILLLAM $i SPEARE, KING HENRY THE FIFTH act 3, sc. 3, 11. 19-21 (E.F.C.
Ludowyk ed., Cambridge 1966).
208 Id. at 1. 35.
209 For MacKinnon, this merely shows how pervasive male supremacy has made
pornography. See MACKINNON, supra note 55, at 174.
210 HAEN, supra note 125, at 25-28.
211 See MACKINNON, supra note 55, at 175.
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objectification they contextualize." 212 Thus, Professor MacKinnon seems
prepared to follow the logic of her argument: "Besides, and this is a heavy one,
if a woman is subjected, why should it matter that the work has other
value?" 213 It is not clear what good qualities a work of art might have that
would rescue it from the dustbin of political incorrectness if it is found to
depict a "subjected woman."
If MacKinnon is truly prepared to sacrifice works that depict women
unfavorably but have serious artistic value, then it seems we have run up
against a radically different vision of the world with which we cannot hope to
reach agreement. Further argument must be pursued on a much more
fundamental level than whether pornography should or should not be
permitted; it should be apparent how much material that is conventionally
protected by the First Amendment is committed to the flames by MacKinnon's
approach. If, on the other hand, it is MacKinnon's view that there are some
disliked works that should be protected, we again face the problem of devising
principled distinctions. You might say, well, we know Milton when we read it
and we know Shakespeare when we see it-but what of their countless
epigones? Certain trends in post-modem art suggest that inferior imitation is
precisely the quality at which certain artists aim.2 14
We encounter grave difficulties in the case of performance artists such as
Karen Finley, who smears food into her genitals, graphically describes violent
sex with children, relatives, priests, and the handicapped, and has defecated on
stage.215 Finley's performances have variously been described as a mixture of
Brecht's political performance strategy, Artaud's sensualism, Ginsberg's
chanting,216 and "female degradation, hilariously deconstructed." 217 Finley
views her work as a protest of sexism.218 For most, her work is probably more
emetic than aphrodisiac. But that is to use the language of obscenity law Even
if acquainted with MacKinnon's conceptual framework, whether Finley's work
involves subordination, promotes objectification, or implies that women enjoy
humiliation is an open question. Finley's work clearly involves "penetrat[ion]
2 12 See id. at 174-75.
213 See ld. at 175. Of course, the use of the rhetorical question here makes it possible
for MacKinnon to hedge her bets on whether she means what she says.
2 14 See Amy M. Adler, Note, Post-Modern Art and the Death of Obscenity Law, 99
YALE LJ. 1366, 1366-69 (1990) (discussing "post-modermsts'" rejection of modernists'
artistic values of originality and quality m favor of denvativeness).
2 15 Id. at 1369; C. Carr, Karen Finley: The Pyranud Club, ARTFORUM, Nov. 1988, at
148; Karen Finley: The Kitchen, ARTr RUM, Mar. 1987, at 130-31.
216 Melissa Hams, Karen Finley: The Kitchen, Franklin Furnace, ARTFORUM, Sept.
1990, at 159-60 (reviewing Filey's performances at The Kitchen).
217 Carr, supra note 215, at 148.
218 Rosen, supra note 28, at 17.
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by objects" 219 and a pretty strong case could be made that woman is
"presented in scenarios of degradation., shown as filthy .. in a context
that makes these conditions sexual." 220 If Finley's work does not fall within the
feminist prohibition, we face the problem posed by Annie Sprinlde, who
performs the same shows at the Kitchen Center for the Performing Arts as she
does for Screw magazine. 221 If we assume that Sprinkle's work mvolh's more
or less the same controversial actions as Finley's, it seems anomalous to
tolerate the one and not the other. If we indulge the temptation to permit
Finley's work and not Sprinkle's (at least for Screw) because Finley's work is
meant to counteract sexist attitudes, then we appear to be engaging m what is
known as viewpoint discrimmation-a stifling of insufficiently progressive
voices precisely because they are insufficiently progressive. Indeed, the
problem of viewpoint discrimination was one of the reasons for the
unconstitutionality of the Indianapolis ordinance authored by MacKinnon. 222
The necessity of distinguishing between permissible and impermissible
sexually explicit work without referring to the author's intentions or viewpoint
is vexing. Consider The Dead Kennedys' song Police Truck: it describes a
violent rape by the police.223 2 Live Crew sings of "a woman being forced to
engage in anal intercourse and lick excrement." 224 The former was intended as
a protest against police brutality, but the latter appears gratuitous. The acts
depicted are the same but the reasons for depicting them very different.
Professor Mark Tushnet makes a related point when discussing music videos:
the interpretation of their "deep meaning" presents unique difficulties, and it is
not clear whether their ultimate content is free from ambiguity.225 MacKinnon
says the Indianapolis ordinance distinguishes depictions of subordination from
219 MACKINNON, supra note 55, at 176; see also INDiANAPOLiS, IND. CODE § 16-3(q)
(1984).
2 20 MACKNNoN, supra note 55, at 176.
221 See Adler, supra note 214, at 1369-70; Gretchen Faust, ARTS MAGAZINE, April
1990, at 104 (reviewing Sprinkle's performance at The Kitchen m which Sprinkle, inter
a//a, fellated a panel of dildos and "insert[ed] a speculum and mvit[ed] the audience to see
her cervix.").
2 22 See American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 329-31 (7th Cir. 1985)
(concluding that First Amendment values trump the importance of reducing images of
subordinated women), aft'd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
2 23 THE DEAD KENNEDYS, Police Truck, on GIVE ME CONVENIENCE OR GIVE ME
DEATH (cherry red records).
22
, GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1117 n.2 (12th ed. 1991) (discussing 2
LIVE CREW, As NASTY AS THEY WANNA BE (Luke Records 1989)).
225 Mark Tushnet, The New Politics of Pornography Regulation, 58 U. CIN. L. REV.,
183, 184 n.1 (1989) (book review).
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depictions that have the effect of subordinating women.226 In theory, such a
distinction would keep books depicting the pornographic subordination of
women, like Andrea Dworkin's Pornography: Men Possessing Women, from
the shredder; it may even allow us to distinguish The Dead Kennedys' song
from 2 Live Crew's. But if it is the pornographic depictions that do the
subordinating, it is difficult to see how we can have the former without the
latter.227
Pictorial v. nonpictorial speech: via media? We observed earlier that we
could find common ground with MacKinnon by prohibiting pornography m
cases where the model or actress was coerced. Here we might try to locate a
toehold on the slippery slope; perhaps pictorial versus nonpictorial
pornography affords a plausible distinction.228 For MacKinnon, this distinction
does not even begin to scratch the surface. For us, it is worrisome for reasons
articulated by Justice Holmes in 1903:
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictonal illustration, outside
the narrowest and most obvious limits. At the one extreme some works of
gemus would be sure to miss appreciation. Their very novelty would make
them repulsive until the public had learned the new language in which their
author spoke. It may be more than doubted, for instance, whether the etchings
of Goya or the paintings of Manet would have been sure of protection when
seen for the first time.229
Nevertheless, there are at least two plausible reasons to draw the pictorial-
nonpictorial distinction. First, only pictorial pornography runs the risk of harm
to models. Second, pictures of genitals appeal less to cognition than, say, a
novel or book describing them (though this distinction, to some extent, ignores
the significance of emotive communication described by Justice Harlan in
Cohen v. Calfornia230). The range of protected speech can be broadened by
226 MAC NON, supra note 55, at 176.
227 See Lisa Duggan et al., False Prerrses: Fenunst Antipornography Legzsladon in
the U.S., in WoMEN AGAINST CENsoRSHIP 130 (Varda Burstyn ed., 1985) (echoing our
conclusions about the dangerous breadth of MacKinnon's ordinance and suggesting that
"subordination" is only one of many terms m it that creates a possibility of aggressive and
broad censorship).
228 Cy. Stanley Kaufinan, On Pornography I: Dissenting and Concumng Opinions,
THE PUBLIC INTEREST, Winter 1971, at 28, 31 (observing distinction between reader-writer
relationship and employment of people to enact sexual fantasies on stage and screen before
an audience).229 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (Holmes, J.).
230 403 U.S. 15 (1971); cf. RCHaRD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE
467 (1990) (noting the value of the emotional component of speech acts).
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limiting prohibition to instances in which an individual is deceived, threatened,
or visited with actual force. Thus, prohibition would clearly be appropriate in
instances in which an actual crime is being depicted.23 1 This narrowing might
face the problem posed by the Pentagon Papers case,232 which permitted
publication of material that had been obtained illegally. But as Professor Tribe
has observed, that case was related to a political question more closely (or at
least traditionally) related to First Amendment concerns. We might also
distinguish work obtained illegally from work created illegally.
Even so, the pictorial distinction may prove hopelessly overbroad to the
extent that we do not wish to proscribe, for example, the paintings (and the
reproductions thereof) of artists such as Ren6 Magritte. Magritte's surreal
paintings often have as their subject dismembered or disassembled female
bodies. Thus, for example, his Le Viol ("The Rape") depicts female breasts (as
eyes) and genitalia (as a mouth) superimposed on a head; in La Bouteille ("The
Bottle") a nude female is stuffed inside a bottle; and m La Philosophie dans le
boudouir ("Philosophy in the bedroom," echoing Marquis de Sade's famous
novel of the same name) another nude is split into body parts. 233
E. Quis Custodiet? Censorship and the Tendency of Intolerance
Background of censorship. Lenin is reputed to have said ideas are more
fatal things than guns. 23 4 History provides adequate illustrations that authorities
have learned this lesson well. Censorship in its varied forms courses through
the ages. The odor of burnt books wafts from the second century forum
romanum, down through the fifteenth century Piazza della Signoria, scene of
Savonarola's Bonfire of the Vanities, past the Berlin bonfires of 1933 in which
the works of Kafka, Heine, Freud, Einstein, Zola, and Proust were incinerated,
to the burning of The Satanic Verses in the annus mirabilis, 1989.235 The
tendency to banish art and the artist is as old as Ovid23 6 and as modem as
231 See TRIBE, supra note 9, § 12-16, at 915 n.71.
232 New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per cunam).
233 See Susan Gubar, Representing Pornography, in FOR ADULT USERS ONLY 47, 49-
54 (Susan Gubar & loan Hoff eds., 1989).
234 Lance Marrow, A Holocaust of Words, TIME, May 2, 1988, at 96.
235 See Paul Berman, Shame, THE Nmv REPUBLIC, Oct. 8, 1990, at 31 (recounting
Western reluctance to defend speech rights m the Rushdie affir). Heine, a German Jew,
wrote m the nineteenth century words that proved hauntingly prophetic m the twentieth:
"Whenever they bum books they will also, m the end, bum human beings." JOHN
BARTLErT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 481 (Emily M. Beck ed., 1980).
23 6 According to Ovid, Augustus exiled him to Pontus for "carmen et error"-a poem
and a mistake. CHARLES W. DUNMORE, SELECrIoNs FROM OvID at viii-ix (Longman, Inc.
1980) (1963).
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Mapplethorpe. 23 7 History and experience make many skeptical whether
government officials are willing or able to distinguish good and bad literature.
Moreover, we worry that any increased power to make these choices, once
vested, will be used as a smokescreen to suppress ideas the authority finds
merely disagreeable-or worse, to target those who, for one reason or another,
are thought inferior.238 Experience teaches us that many of the great works of
art and literature have been banned-for political or moral reasons.
No man, said Dr. Johnson, would care to go on trial for his life once a week,
even if possessed of absolute proofs of Is innocence. By the same token, no
man wants to be arraigned in a criminal court, and displayed in the sensational
newspapers, as a purveyor of indecency, however strong his assurance of
innocence.23 9
We are left to wonder how many works were abandoned or never created,. how
many Miltons were muted because of censorship's in terrorem effect.
Tendency of intolerance. The history of censorship is closely related to a
more general social tendency (a theme of the great French novelists) 240 to
smooth out everything at a variance with itself, to chisel away all prominent or
obtruding features of individual personality. The problem of intolerance is
proverbial in the domain of religion, but it manifests itself elsewhere. One is
tempted to say that intolerance is an Inverse function of certainty, because
heresy and the urge to suppress it tend to arise when the truth is uncertain. This
point must not be carried too far; after all, we teach arithmetic dogmatically241
and have little patience for those who view it skeptically. Perhaps Justice
Holmes had something like this in mind when he observed that squelching free
speech was "logical" when the truth was known (or, to be more precise, "if
23 7 See ScAUER, supra note 224, at 117 n.2 (discussing Mapplethorpe indictment).
238 q TRIBE, supra note 9, § 15-12, at 1428 n.53 (noting importance of shifting
inquiry to higher levels of generality to prevent state from "masking forbidden antipathy to
a group m the form of a moral aversion to what the group does") (citations omitted); Hunter
& Law, supra note 144, at 69, 108-11. Indeed, a decision by the Canadian Supreme Court
based largely on MacKinnon's work was the springboard for Canadian seizures of books
authored by her antipornography cocrusader Andrea Dworkin. Leanne Katz, Censor's
Helpers, THE NEWYORKTMEs, Dec. 4, 1993, at 21.
23 9 MENCKEN, supra note 12, at 262-63.
240 See, e.g., BENAMINCONSTANT, ADOLPHE (C.P Courtney ed., 1989); HoNoRDE
BALZAC, LE PIaE GORIOT [FATHER GORIOT] (Therry Bodin ed., 1971); GUSTAVE
FLAUBERT, L'EDUCATION SENTIMENTALE [SENTIMENTAL EDUCATION] (P.M. Wetherill ed.,
1984).
241 See Bertrand Russell, The Value of Free Thought, in BERTRAND RUSSELL ON GOD
AND RELIGION 239, 268 (Al Seckel ed., 1986).
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you have no doubt of your premises"). 242 But truth is sometimes uncertain
even in the realm of mathematics, to say nothing of history, philosophy, or of
the social sciences. When authorities find it necessary to suppress one idea to
cause another to be believed, this very fact argues for more, not less,
speech. 243
Free speech-the refusal to quash views we find unsettling or hateful-
teaches us (through a process Lee Bollinger has termed the "internal dialectic
of tolerance") 244 intellectual attitudes and civic virtues essential to a pluralist
society: self-restraint and self-control. 245 The "impulse to intolerance" 246 is
therefore not a problem peculiar to the censor but part of a more general
deficiency in human nature. If one appreciates this fact, the reasons for
allowing Hustler and Mein Kampfto be published are at bottom identical.
Once the moral legitimacy of the censor is accepted, his power to act on
this general impulse to intolerance, and the evil thereby engendered, is wide-
ranging. Perhaps the liberal's argument for a permissive legal attitude toward
consumption of pornography is based largely on a prudential judgment that the
tendency to intolerance should not be encouraged.
F. Federalism and Frst Amendment Issues: Should We Allow
&perimentation?
The issue of federalism and pornography legislation has not, to our
knowledge, been raised either by commentators or by courts. This seems
unfortunate for at least two reasons. First, MacKinnon's approach to
pornography has enjoyed a greater reception at the local level. Second, a
242 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Holmes articulated a similar view elsewhere:
But on their premises it seems to me logical in the Catholic Church to kill heretics and
[for] the Puritans to whip Quakers-and I see nothing more wrong in it from our
ultimate standards than I do in killing Germans when we are at war. When you are
thoroughly convinced that you are nght-wholeheartedly desire an end-and have no
doubt of your power to accomplish it-I see nothing but mumcipal regulations to
interfere with your using your power to accomplish it. The sacredness of human life is
a formula that is good only inside a system of law.
EDMUND WILSON, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, in PATRIOTIC GoaR 743, 764 (1962)
(emphasis added) (alteration m original) (quoting a Holmes letter written to Harold Laski).
243 C. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (Brandeis, I., concurring).
244 See BOLLINGER, supra note 136, at 124-74.
245 Id.
246 kd at 139.
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Brandeisian "laboratories of democracy" 247 argument (diverse, particular
experimentation with economic and social models so that, by interstate
comparison, the best social arrangement emerges) works in favor of an
Indianapolis-type approach. The question of federalism and constitutional
adjudication is no small subject. Here we want only to make some observations
about legislation that intrudes on areas of constitutional concern.
Most First Amendment doctrine cannot be justified by simple reference
either to an antecedent choice for democracy or to an originalist understanding.
The Court clearly has not followed an originalist approach to First Amendment
analysis. The mere incorporation of the First Amendment through the
Fourteenth Amendment and consequent application to the states changed First
Amendment analysis in ways the Framers surely did not envision.248 The
framers likely did not intend (unless their intentions are elevated to an
extremely high level of abstraction) the constitutionalization of defamation law
or the broad protection given to sexually explicit material.249 But once the
constitutional text and the Framers' intentions are no longer seen as
dispositive,250 judicial review, "at least potentially a deviant institution in a
democratic society," 25 1 becomes increasingly problematic. 25 2
247 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (articulating conception of states as laboratories engaged in novel experiments).
248 See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (incorporating directly, for the
first time, the First Amendment into the Fourteenth). Stromberg was foreshadowed by the
Court's opinion m Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). Many believed that the First
Amendment and the entire Bill of Rights were unnecessary because Congress had not been
given power to legislate concerning these matters. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at
513-14 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
249 See generally THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
IMrrATIONS 414-26 (1972); 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMEmARIES ON THE CONSTrrUTION OF
THEUNrEDSTATES §§ 1874-83 (Boston, Illliard 1833).
25 0 The difference is that between Marbury v. Madison (pre-existing rules of
constitutional law embedded m the text are discoverable and can be applied) and any of the
Court's modern Commerce Clause cases. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137
(1803).
251 BICKRL, supra note 138, at 128.
25 2 Marbury v. Madison was premised on a static notion of the Constitution: the
sources of constitutional judgment are embedded in the Constitution. Marbury, 5 U.S. at
137. But see TRIBE, supra note 9, § 1-9, at 15-16, § 8-7, at 584, 586 n.37 (contrary to
many scholars and commentators, Professor Tribe sees institutional concerns as having
limited relevance); J. Skelly Wright, 7e Role of the Supreme Court in a Democranc
Society, 54 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 11 (1968) (arguing that although courts are not politically
responsible they are politically responsive).
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[1]f the people themselves .... decide in accordance with democratic
procedures that some speech will no longer be tolerated, then it is not 'the
government' that is depriving 'us,' the citizens, of our freedom to choose but
we as citizens deciding what the rules of conduct within the community will
be. Then the "democracy" has functioned, and it may be asked whether it does
not '[strike] at the very heart of [a] democracy' to say that the citizens cannot
choose to make that decision. 2
53
Here a court faces what Bickel termed "the inner vulnerability, the self-doubt
of an institution which is electorally irresponsible and has no earth to draw
strength from." 25 4 One tack a court might take when a purely textual and
originalist approach has been abandoned is to give increased deference to
institutions that are more politically responsible.25 5 Yet even this approach
would not favor MacKinnon's ordinance.
The more a legislative enactment intrudes upon an area of constitutional
concern, the more searching a court's inquiry should be.25 6 First, a court
should assure itself that the legislation has been well-debated, that areas of
constitutional concern have been fully weighed, and that the legislation is not
the product of legislative haste or inattention.25 7 Although the Hudnut court
made no reference to legislative haste, there is evidence that the Indianapolis
ordinance, like the proposed Minneapolis ordinance, was the result of "unusual
haste" by the legislative body and that constitutional concerns failed to receive
adequate legislative deliberation. 258
Second, and more controversially, a court should also be willing to give
slightly more deference to Congress, the most broadly representative legislative
body, than to state and municipal legislative bodies. 25 9 This turns federalism on
253 BOLLINGER, supra note 136, at 50-51 (second and third brackets in original).
25 4 BICKEL, supra note 138, at 184.
255 See Terrance Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 MCH. L. REv. 1033,
1046 (1981); Terrance Sandalow, Racial Preferences in Higher Education: Political
Responsibility and the Judicial Role, 42 U. Cm. L. REv 653, 657 (1975) ("The democratic
commitment of our age requires-or at least has seemed to many to require-that important
value choices rest with institutions that are more politically responsible than courts.").
256 .LEARNEDHAND, THEBILLOFRIGHTS 11-18 (1958).
257 C. Terrance Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 MIcH. L. REv 1162,
1186-87 (1977).
258 See DowNs, supra note 78, at xxii-xxiii, 76, 82-83, 91, 95, 112, 116, 130.
259 A problem with giving greater deference to the federal government is that the
standards adopted by it may well be more rigorous than those some state and local
governments would choose. Put differently, "[The dangers of national censorship are not
the same as the dangers of local suppression. The federal government is apt to impose the
standards of Dubuque on Greenwich Village, whereas Dubuque can impose them only in
Dubuque." BICKEL, supra note 60, at 104.
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its head.260 But the rationale for attaching greater deference to national as
opposed to local legislation is classical and articulated in Federalist No. 10:261
"Extend the sphere and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests;
you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common
motive to invade the rights of other citizens." 262 This "inhibiting" argument is
most compelling to those who believe greater danger lies in governmental
action than inaction. If one rejects this view, one might be more sympathetic to
the facilitative "laboratories" approach. The suitability of the "laboratories"
approach tends to be more persuasive when neither text nor tradition speaks to
the problem and the problem is a new one facing society. This is because
judicial action stands on the firmest ground when it is rooted in text or as part
of an evolving tradition. As for new problems facing society, it is one thing for
a court to modify or ratify the attempts of private action or of the legislature
when such systems of decisionmaking have at least been given some play; it is
quite another for a court to make the initial decision, "thus arrogating the entire
responsibility, from beginning to end" 263 and removing responsibility from the
private and legislative sectors. MacKinnon's analysis is novel; 26 4 the
underlying problem of pornography is not. We clearly have an established
tradition of protecting speech (which includes speech unfavorable to women)
and this tradition finds textual support in the First Amendment. This suggests
that a court is justified in exercising a high degree of scrutiny and in according
less deference to state or local legislation that trenches on previously protected
speech.
260 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (articulating conception of states as laboratories).
261 THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 83 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Justice Holmes, perhaps for slightly different reasons, saw judicial review of state legislation
as more important than review of national legislation. OLIVER W HOLMES, Law and the
Cort, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 291, 295-96 (2d prtg. 1952) ("I do not think the
United States would come to an end if we lost our power to declare an Act of Congress
void. I do think the Umon would be imperiled if we could not make that declaration as to
the laws of the several States.").
262 THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 261, at 83.
2 63 BiCa, supra note 60, at 107, see also, supra note 9, § 12-17, at 921-24
(observing that absent evidence of a chilling effect, the Hudnut court might have done better
to avoid deciding the constitutionality of the Indianapolis ordinance until applied).
264 It may be fairer to say that orthodox analysis of pornography ishandled, but did
not ignore, pornography's effects on women; arguments about pornography and its relation
to criminal and antisocial behavior toward women are traditional.
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G. Macfinnon's Rejection of Legitimate Disagreement
Even those who are only casually acquainted with MacKinnon's work
likely find it difficult to ignore the aura of visionary radicalism emanating from
it. It is not simply her heated style of argument that is offputting; rather, it is
her apparent conviction that those who dare to disagree with her are driven by
deeply illegitimate motives. Instances of this outlook permeate her work. When
arguing against the balancing of a panel on the regulation of pornography in
order to add perspectives that differ from her own, she asks, "When world
hunger is discussed, is it necessary to have the pro-hunger side presented?" 265
When discussing the editorial content of Playboy, summarizing its articles
which argue that the magazine falls under First Amendment protection, she
deals with this concern by alleging that masturbation has made men
psychologically equate the pleasure of orgasm with Playboy's editorial
positions. She caps this speculation off with a rhetorical question curious in
implication: "Ever wonder why men are so passionate about the First
Amendment?"2 66 Her explanation for the phenomenon of widespread resistance
on the part of women to the establishment of the Equal Rights Amendment-
that "sex inequality gave them what little they had, so little that they felt they
couldn't afford to lose it"267-is condescending towards women and dismissive
of the phenomenon of legitimate disagreement. This exclusionary trend reaches
its zenith when she denies that women who disagree with her on questions of
philosophical method, political strategy, or pornography regulation can be
feminists, 268 thus purging all non-radicals from the movement.
An uglier departure from the norms of civilized discourse occurs when she
terms those feminists who disagree with her views on pornography
"collaborators" because they are "siding with the pornographers." 269 This
astonishing metaphor, conjuring up visions of Vichy France under the Nazis,
loses much of its strength when it is recalled that whenever one takes a position
on any public issue, there will doubtless exist unsavory characters who for their
own reasons will take that side. Guilt by association is not generally held to be
a strong argument, but for use as the central unifying metaphor of
MacKinnon's On Collaboration,270 it is apparently strong enough. Professor
2 6 5 MACKINNON, supra note 51, at 133.
266 MACKINNON, supra note 50, at 138.
2 6 7 MACKINNON, supra note 54 at 226.
268 See MACKINNON, supra note 173, at 60; MACKINNON, supra note 50, at 137
269 See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, On Collaboration, in FEdMM UNMODIFIE
198, 205 (1987).270 Id. at 198-205.
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Wendy Brown's comments on MacKinnon's style of dealing with those with
whom she disagrees is on point:
Any expression of women's differences, as well as any moments of power,
pleasure, and agency that call into question the total and systematic quality of
gender subordination, must therefore be explained away as illusory, challenged
as liberal, fainthearted or apologist, or denounced as collaborative with the
regime, all of which MacKinnon does whenever she encounters a femmist
argument or practice at odds with her account. 271
This refusal to take seriously views that differ from her own is ultimately
an epiphenomenal consequence of MacKinnon's rejection of universalism. 272
But universalism-the idea that moral rules apply to everyone, regardless of
time or space-must in some sense be accepted by anyone who thinks law is
worthwhile-the concept of law is infused with it.273 Without universalism, thekind of moral evaluation that is one of MacKinnon's specialties-indignation
and fury about injustice, disregarded perspectives, suffering, unfair privileges,
and abuse-can only be windy language lacking moral force. This rejection of
universalism helps to explain both the overheated tone of her writing and thejarring impact it sometimes has upon the reader. If we are really to take
MacKinnon at her word when she says m one of her social critiques, "we are
not attempting to be objective about it, we're attempting to represent the point
271 Wendy Brown, Gonsacounes Razing, THE NATiON, Jan. 8, 1990, at 63.
272 Richard Rorty takes a much more sympathetic view of MacKinnon's rejection of
umversalism. In his words,
I hope that feminists will continue to consider the possibility of dropping realism
and universalism, dropping the notion that the subordination of women is utrnesica!/y
abominable, dropping the claim that there is something called "right" or "justice" or
"humanity" which has always been on their side, making their claims true.
I admit that insofar as feminists adopt a Deweyan rhetoric of the sort I havejust described, they commit themselves to a lot of apparent paradoxes, and incur the
usual charges of relativism, irrationalism and power-worship. But these disadvantages
are, I think, outweighed by the advantages.
Richard Rorty, Feminism and Pragmatism, MICH. Q. Rv. 231, 237-38 (Spring 1991)(footnote omitted).
273 This recognition can be traced to Roman law. See, e.g., Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S.
(16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842) (Justice Story quotes Lord Mansfield quoting Cicero: "Non erit alialex Romae, alia Athenis; alia nunc, alia posthac; sed et apud onies gentes, et omm tempore
una eademque lex obtinebit.).
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of view of women," 274 we must come to several disquieting conclusions. We
must conclude that MacKinnon is, despite her rhetoric, not so much concerned
with justice for everyone as she is for the interests of women. We must also
conclude that MacKinnon thinks the two may sometimes come into conflict.
And we must finally conclude that, when they do, MacKinnon will favor the
cause of the group in which she is interested over the welfare of society as a
whole. There is nothing wrong with favoring particular groups, but it is a
conceit to argue or assume that such favoring has anything to do with
justice.275 And it is a further conceit-a conceit intellectually sloppy,
historically naive, and grossly arrogant-to think that one person can accurately
determine and express the interests and desires of half of the world's
population. 276
IV. CONCLUSION
Not only against the authors themselves, but even against their books the
censors aimed their wrath such that the records of the most brilliant and
illustrious men were burned in the courtyard of the forum. Obviously they
thought with that fire they had extinguished the voice of the Roman people, the
liberty of the senate and the conscience of the human race.
- Cornelius Tacitus 277
We have criticized the work of Professor MacKinnon throughout this last
section. We do not mean to undervalue her remarkable achievement in this
field of the law. One need not agree with her arguments to recognize that her
work has changed the way people think about a fundamental issue and
persuaded many erstwhile defenders of pornographic speech to amend their
views.278 Thus, while the ordinance in Indianapolis was overturned, it would
be a mistake to think that MacKinnon's attack on pornography was defeated.
Perhaps the approach she advocates will, in the end, carry the day. But if it
does, it will be because its purveyors proved successful in the marketplace of
ideas. 279 The moral passion and rhetorical power evident in MacKinnon's work
274 MACKINNON, supra note 178, at 86.
275 See RICHARDs, supra note 151, at 7-31.
276 MENcKE, supra note 12, at 198.
2 77 Taitus, supra note 193, at 93-94 (translation ours).
278 Cf Cass R. Sunstem, Fermnsm and Legal Theory, 101 HARv. L. REV. 826, 826
(1988) (reviewing CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987)).
279 The marketplace metaphor, as we saw earlier, is criticized by fenumist writers as
inappropriate in contexts of hierarchy. It is sometimes said that the marketplace metaphor is
misleading or misguided because even, say, genocide can be accepted there. Still another
and related criticism is that the marketplace does not ensure the discovery of truth. Two
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has much to do with an implied umversalism; absent it, MacKinnon is in the
position of the builder of the heavenly city who filches stones from an ever-
more-unsteady foundation. How can one take seriously .someone whose
methodological presumptions suggest that there is no need to listen to her
precisely because she lives in a different moral universe? (Of course, since
MacKinnon intimates that all sexual congress is ipso facto a product of male
coercion,280 perhaps the different moral universe hypothesis should not be
immediately discarded.) Her belief that "penetration itself is known to be a
violation," 28 1 that rape and intercourse are "difficult to distinguish," 282 may
deserve interest, compassion, even pity, but someone who wishes to write these
ideas into law may merit a less charitable response.283
Additionally, the general problem of regulation-that is, its practitioners
must issue rules, which themselves generally force a crude, one-size-fits-all
approach on whatever is to be regulated-can only worsen when literature and
art are at the mercy of state action. Herbert Spencer's Popperian insight is
worth repeating here:
As the alchemist attributed his successive disappointments to some
disproportion in the ingredients, some impurity, or some too great
temperature, and never to the futility of his process or the impossibility of Is
aim; so, every failure of state-regulations the law-worshipper explains away as
being caused by this trifling oversight, or that little mistake: all which
oversights and mistakes he assures you will in future be avoided. Eluding the
related responses seem m order. First, it is true that the idea of genocide has been accepted,
but m societies that scarcely can be said to have had a free market in ideas and speech.
Second, it is unportant that the marketplace analogy not be confused with a biological
analogy. Competition in the marketplace can reliably bring about the "socially desired price
and output only if competitors are forbidden to employ certain tactics, including violence,
fraud, and collusion." POSNER, supra note 230, at 118-19. This holds true with our
marketplace metaphor-certain procedural rules must be followed. The ultimate success of
truth is not inevitable and, as Mill observed, a sufficient application of legal or social
penalties may generally succeed m the propagation of error. JOHN STUART MILL, ON
LI ERTY 34-36 (Currin V. Shields ed., The Bobbs Merrill Co. 1956) (1859). The great
advantage truth enjoys is its tendency of rediscovery-n more obliging times.
2 80 MAcKNNON, supra note 51, at 128-29.
281 Catharme A. MacKinnon, Fenumsm, Manasm, Method, and the State, 8 SIGNS
635, 648 (1983).
282 Id. at 647.
283 CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 172
(1989). A portrait of ideas underlying the statement is chapter seven of this book. See also
MACKINNON, supra note 55, at 3, 7
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facts as he does after this fashion, volley after volley of them produce no
effect. 284
To repeat, we have seen the radical change m the legal analysis of
pornography. We have also sensed the power of MacKinnon's critique both of
traditional legal analysis and pornography Her analysis suggests that
pornography is ultimately as harmful as it is distasteful. We have seen,
however, that her conceptions of causation and consent are problematic and
that the reasons for symbolic prohibition of pornography are unpersuasive.
The history of intolerance and censorship stand like a beacon amid
treacherous shoals, cautioning us to seek safer haven elsewhere. 285 The dangers
of overinclusion, especially m light of trends in both classical and recent art,
present a potent counterargument to MacKinnon's approach (just as they do to
the Court's obscenity doctrine). MacKinnon's understanding of relations
between the sexes is, to put it as charitably as possible, idiosyncratic. That
understanding infects her every policy prescription. The deep commonalities
that run from her ideas back to those of her puritamcal predecessors serve as a
powerful reminder: we ought to try and see that those people who want to
interfere with the private lives of others do not so influence legislatures.
Professor MacKinnon has offered us a chance to radically diminish our
First Amendment freedoms, based on dubious theories of human action. We
must politely decline the invitation to join m such a dangerous undertaking.
284 HERBERT SPENCER, THE MAN VERsus THE STATE 328-29 (Eric Mack ed., Liberty
Press 1982) (1884).
285 Albert Camus's remark on the press seems true of speech generally: "The free
press without doubt can be good or bad, but assuredly, without liberty it will never be
anything but bad.... Liberty is nothing but the chance of being better, while servitude is
the assurance of being worse." ALBERT CAmUs, EsSAIS [EssAys] 1812-13 (Roger Quilliot
& Louis Faucon eds., 1965) (As stated by Camus, "La presse libre peut sans doute 8tre
bonne ou mauvaise, mais, assur6ment, sans la libertd elle ne sera jamais autre chose que
mauvaise.... La libert6 n'est nen d'autre que la chance d'etre meilleur, tandis que la
servitude est l'assurance du pire.").
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